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ABSTRACT
AN INVESTIGATION OF
THE EFFECTS OF POPULATION DYNAMICS ON
GROWTH AND TRADE IN AN
OVERLAPPING-GENERATIONS GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
Mohamed Mehdi Jelassi
Ph.D. in Economics
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Serdar Sayan
December 2004
In this study, variants of a two-sector, two-factor overlapping-generations model
are solved under autarky and free trade scenarios to investigate the effects of pop-
ulation dynamics on growth and trade. Simulation exercises are also performed
to develop a deeper understanding of the analytical findings and to visualize the
time paths of model variables. These numerical exercises complement analyti-
cal solutions, providing significant insights into the nature of initial conditions
affecting growth and convergence performance of closed economies. Concerning
open economies, possible implications of population growth differentials for the
patterns of trade flows between economies that are identical except for population
growth rates are explored as in the static Heckscher-Ohlin model. Our analysis
shows that population growth rate differentials give way to differences in relative
commodity and factor prices, creating the basis for comparative advantages in the
same way as suggested by the static Heckscher-Ohlin model. We also show that
these demographic differences prevent comparative advantages from getting elim-
inated in the long-run, thereby allowing trade to continue to occur even after the
steady state is reached. Our solutions reveal, however, that trade does not neces-
sarily improve welfare for both parties in the long-run. The explanation we offer
for this nicely complements previous studies that obtained similar results using
overlapping-generations general equilibrium models within two country set-ups
with steady populations.
Keywords: Dynamic trade; Population growth rate; Overlapping-generations gen-
eral equilibrium model, Heckscher-Ohlin.
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O¨ZET
NU¨FUS DI˙NAMI˙KLERI˙NI˙N BU¨YU¨ME VE TI˙CARET
U¨ZERI˙NDEKI˙ ETKI˙LERI˙NI˙N C¸AKIS¸AN-NESI˙LLER
GENEL DENGE MODELLEMESI˙ YOLUYLA
I˙NCELENMESI˙
Mohamed Mehdi Jelassi
Iktisat, Doktora
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Doc¸. Dr. Serdar Sayan
Aralık 2004
Bu c¸alis¸ma, nu¨fus dinamiklerinin bu¨yu¨me ve ticaret u¨zerindeki etkilerini, iki-
sekto¨r ve iki-fakto¨rlu¨ bir c¸akıs¸an-nesiller modelinin c¸esitli varsayımlar altında elde
edilen analitik c¸o¨zu¨mlerinden c¸ıkan sonuc¸lar ıs¸ıg˘ında incelemektedir. Bu analitik
c¸o¨zu¨mler, is¸aret ettikleri sonuc¸ların daha somut bic¸imde kavranabilmesi ve model
deg˘is¸kenlerinin zaman ic¸inde izledig˘i patikaların da izlenebilmesi amacıyla yapılan
sayısal simu¨lasyonlarla tamamlanmıstır. So¨z konusu sayısal egzersizler, nu¨fus
artıs¸ hızları da dahil olmak u¨zere farklı bas¸langıc¸ kos¸ullarına sahip kapalı ekonomi-
lerin, bu¨yu¨me performansları ve daha gelis¸mis¸ ekonomileri yakalama potansiyel-
lerinin nasıl farklılas¸abileceg˘ine dair c¸ok o¨nemli o¨nseziler sag˘lamaktadır.
Ac¸ık ekonomilere ilis¸kin olarak ise, nu¨fusları farklı hızlarda artan ekonomilerin
birbirleriyle yaptıkları ticaret kalıplarında zaman ic¸inde go¨zlenecek deg˘is¸ikler,
statik Heckscher-Ohlin modelindeki yaklas¸ıma paralel bic¸imde nu¨fus artıs¸ oranları
dıs¸ındaki tu¨m karakteristikleri aynı olan ekonomiler go¨z o¨nu¨ne alınarak incelen-
mektedir. Analizimiz nu¨fus artıs¸ hızlarındaki farklılıkların her u¨lkedeki go¨reli
mal ve fakto¨r fiyatlarını Heckscher-Ohlin modelinin o¨nerdig˘ine benzer bic¸imde
farklılas¸tıracag˘ını ve bu yolla kars¸ılastırmalı u¨stu¨nlu¨kler yaratacag˘ını ispatla-
maktadır. Sonuc¸larımız, yaratılan bu kars¸ılas¸tırmalı u¨stu¨nlu¨klerin nu¨fus artıs¸
hızları farklı kaldıg˘ı su¨rece uzun vadede de korunacag˘ı ve ticaretin durag˘an-
dengede de devam edeceg˘ini de go¨stermektedir. O¨te yandan, elde edilen
model c¸o¨zu¨mleri ticaretin uzun do¨nem refah artırıcı etkisinin her iki taraf ic¸in
gec¸erli olmayabileceg˘ini de ortaya koymaktadır. Bu ilginc¸ go¨zleme ilis¸kin olarak
sundug˘umuz ac¸ıklama, iki u¨lke arasındaki dinamik ticaret dengesini c¸akıs¸an-
nesiller c¸erccevesi bag˘lamında ancak nu¨fus artıs¸ına izin vermeksizin ele alan daha
o¨nceki c¸alıs¸malardan olus¸an literatu¨ru¨ tamamlayıcı niteliktedir.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : Uluslararası ticaretin dinamik dengesi; Nu¨fus artıs¸ hızı;
C¸akıs¸an-nesiller genel denge modeli; Heckscher-Ohlin modeli.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Globally observed decline in fertility and mortality rates gradually lower pop-
ulation growth rates, eventually causing a visible increase in the share of elderly
population around the world. In countries where this demographic process has
worked faster than the others, the population age pyramid’s base already began
to shrink, while its summit started to widen. Most members of the OECD, for
instance, have been witnessing a rapid reduction in the population growth rates
and an acceleration in the pace of aging. This process is projected to continue
until the overall dependency rate (i.e., the ratio of population outside the work-
ing age to the working age population) exceeds 70% in the 2040s (Kenc¸ and
Sayan (2001)). Increases in this ratio are likely to have significant implications
for the OECD economies, as well as the countries with which they have strong
ties, since the movement of factors and commodities across borders serves as
a channel transmitting the effects of demographic changes in one country onto
other economies. In their pioneering work, Kenc¸ and Sayan (2001) showed that
these demographic spill over effects could be important. They noted, based on
their results, that small economies trading commodities and capital with large
economies may be exposed to the effects of population aging earlier than their
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own demographic transitions would have implied.
Many developing countries are yet to face a similar decline in the population
growth rate indeed, and hence, still have populations that are predominantly
young. The existing differences in the population growth rates and hence varia-
tions in age profiles of populations in different parts of the world are not likely
to be eliminated for several decades to come. In fact, if this disparity in the
population growth rates between the developed and the developing parts of the
world is to prevail as projected by demographers, not only the labor forces will
continue to diverge, but also variations in the age profiles of populations will
become increasingly visible. This differential speed of population aging in the
developing and developed areas will necessarily affect the relative abundance of
capital as well. The labor supply will eventually begin to fall wherever population
aging sets in and capital formation will be slowed down by the associated decrease
in savings. By the modern theory of international trade, differences in relative
factor endowments form the theoretical basis for differences in commodity and
factor prices underlying trade and factor movements. In other words, differences
in population growth rates can be viewed as a potentially major determinant of
commodity and factor flows across borders.
The main objective of this dissertation is to study growth and trade implica-
tions of population dynamics within a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
In order to use a dynamic structure that allows for the age composition of pop-
ulations to differ across countries later on, the overlapping-generations framework
was found to be suitable for modeling our prototype closed economy. Moreover,
analysis of the direction and magnitude of changes in trade flows in response to
changes in factor endowments requires that at least two commodities and two
factors of production be considered. Thus, a two-commodity, two-factor, two-
generation framework was chosen for our prototype economy. The changes in
relative factor endowments resulting from changes in age composition of popula-
tion over time were captured through the addition of population dynamics.
A simple version of the two-sector overlapping-generations economy in Galor
(1992b) was considered to model each economy’s autarky equilibrium. Economic
activity in this model extends over infinite discrete time and is conducted under
perfect competition and certainty. The consumption side of this economy consists
of agents living in a typical overlapping-generations world. They live for two peri-
ods and have perfect foresight. Agents are homogeneous both inter-generationally
and intra-generationally. At any given period, two types of individuals are alive:
young that are born in the current period, and are living the first period of their
lives, and olds who were born in the previous period and are living the last period
of their lives. In their first period of life, agents work by inelastically supplying
their labor endowment, earn the competitive market wage, and decide on how
much to consume and how much to save. In the second period of life, agents just
rent their savings and consume all their wealth.
The production side consists of two sectors: Two goods are produced accord-
ing to constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production technologies. However,
unlike the standard practice used in two-sector models in the literature, such
as Galor (1992b) and Azariadis (1993), the non-perishable good serves as an in-
vestment as well as a consumption good, whereas the perishable good serves as
a consumption good only. The production environment is competitive and labor
and capital are perfectly mobile across sectors.
Following a survey of the existing literature in Chapter 2, the discussion of
this dissertation begins with an in-depth analysis of the long-run closed-form
solutions for this version of the closed economy model. Analytical solutions for
such an economy are shown to be feasible to obtain for the steady state values
of all variables. The discussion in this chapter shows that the dynamics of such
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an economy can be expressed through a single non-linear difference equation in
terms of one variable only as in Galor (1992b).
Chapter 4 presents sample numerical solutions to develop a better understand-
ing of the dynamics of the economy through a phase diagram analysis. With the
help of these simulation exercises, not only do we provide a clear idea about
how the economy moves from its initial endowments to the long-run equilibrium,
but we also provide a visualization of the model variables’ time paths that are
analytically challenging to derive.
In Chapter 5, the long-run closed-form solutions of the autarkic economy
obtained in Chapter 3 are used to explore the effect of population growth rates
on the economy’s steady state key variables. This chapter describes the role that
differences in population growth rates across nations could play as a determinant
of long-run comparative advantages. Unequal population growth rates give rise to
differentials in wage rates and rentals for capital under autarky conditions causing
costs of production and relative prices to differ, hence creating the grounds for
trade. Simulation experiments are performed again to help visualize the time
paths of the economy’s key variables, complementing the analytical findings.
In Chapter 6, the closed economy model is extended to allow for trade to see
the effects of population growth rate differentials within a dynamic Heckscher-
Ohlin framework. Two countries, similar in every aspect except for the popula-
tion growth rates, are allowed to trade using the 2x2x2x2 extension of autarky
model developed for this purpose. Consistently with the predictions of the static
Heckscher-Ohlin model, the addition of dynamics does not affect the direction
of trade between the two countries, but trade is shown not to necessarily lead
to welfare gains for both countries. That trade might not be Pareto-superior to
autarky is consistent with previously obtained results by Sayan and Uyar (2001),
Sayan (2002) and Sayan (2005) based on numerical solutions of the trade model
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with growing populations and for different ranges of parameters. This result is
also consistent with a number of studies including Mountford (1998) where it is
demonstrated that if a dynamic two period overlapping-generations structure is
added to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model under stationary populations, then
the static implications of international trade can be reversed over time.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. The lessons that can be derived from
the study and the contributions to the existing literature can be summarized as
follows:
First, it is shown that the long-run closed-form solutions of a 2x2x2
overlapping-generations autarky economy are feasible to obtain when one good
is allowed to be used for consumption as well as investment purposes with the
other serving as a consumption good only.
Second, it is demonstrated that difference in population growth rates across
nations give way to differences in relative commodity and factor prices, creating
the basis for comparative advantages and hence determining the pattern of trade
between nations in the same way as suggested by the static Heckscher-Ohlin
model.
Third, the long-run closed-form solutions for a 2x2x2x2 overlapping-
generations world economy are derived and used to analyze the nature of dynamic
free trade equilibrium.
Fourth, it is established that population growth rate differential prevent com-
parative advantages from getting eliminated in the long-run despite the equaliza-
tion of prices, thereby allowing trade to continue to occur even after the steady
state is reached.
Fifth, the welfare levels under autarky and trade are compared and it is shown
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that the static Heckscher-Ohlin results can not be generalized to hold in a dynamic
setting like the one considered, since, trade does not necessarily improve welfare
for both parties in the long-run. This is because the high population growth
country will behave as a large country capable of setting the terms of trade in
the long-run, as a result of the parallel growth in its share of total world output
and population. For example, China currently having one-fifth of the world’s
population with a relatively high population growth rate1 has been increasingly
integrating to the world trading system. Stronger integration of China to the
global economy has already started affecting world prices of many commodities.
While an analysis of the impact of China’s integration to the global markets is
beyond the scope of this dissertation, it serves as a good example illustrating the
relevance of some of the issues tackled here.
Last but not least, all the findings above are supported and steady state
solutions are complemented by simulation exercises that visually describe the
time paths of all model variables under study.
1China’s average annual population growth rate, between 1980 and 2002 is 1.2%, whereas
that for the high income countries is 0.7%,WDI (2004).
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Several studies in the literature noted and studied the effects that the popula-
tion growth rate can have on trade patterns and growth performance of national
economies. These studies can be classified according to the type and structures
of the models used. First, there is the North-South trade literature. Second
are the studies incorporating differences in population growth rates into dynamic
growth models to explore implications of these differences for trade. Third group
of studies are based on overlapping-generations general equilibrium models.
Motivated by the observation that population growth rates do differ between
the Northern and Southern hemispheres of the globe, several researchers at-
tempted to investigate the consequences of this existing gap. Matsuyama (2000)
looks at the role that population size and technology can play in trade within
a Ricardian framework which explains comparative advantages by differences in
technology. The main contribution of this study is to replace the standard ho-
motheticity property of consumption and employ in lieu a continuum of goods.
Goods at the lower end of the spectrum are consumed by all households. As
their income levels go up, the households expand their range of consumption by
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adding higher-indexed goods to their baskets. In order to explore the implica-
tions of trade, two countries with nonhomothetic preferences are considered: The
North is developed with high income, has a comparative advantage and thus spe-
cializes in the production of higher-indexed goods (goods with high elasticities
of demand). The South is underdeveloped with low income, has a comparative
advantage and thus specializes in the production of lower-indexed goods (goods
whose demand has low income elasticity). Within this framework, the faster
population growth in the South can generate product cycle phenomena. It is
argued that South experiences a secular decline in its terms of trade, and the
lower-end industries in North move continuously to the South. As the prices
of imports from South declines, the northern households expand their range of
consumption continuously towards higher indexed goods, thereby giving birth
to new industries in North. Another implication of this asymmetry of demand
complementarities between goods is that as a result of faster population growth
and the uniform productivity growth in the South associated with an improve-
ment in global productivity, the welfare gain of productivity growth is unevenly
distributed. North can capture all the benefits of its own uniform productiv-
ity growth, whereas South may lose from its own uniform productivity growth.
When the price of lower-indexed goods decline, demand for higher-indexed goods
will increase as the households respond to the higher real income resulting from
the reduction in prices of lower-indexed goods by adding higher-indexed goods to
their consumption baskets.
One interesting question in the context of North-South trade relations is
whether the South would catch up to the North in standard of living if the South
share the same standard of living, given that the North starts with more capi-
tal stock in per capita terms than the South. Chen (1992) shows that the world
economy will approach a long-run equilibrium where the rich countries remain
rich and the poor countries remain poor.
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Next are studies including the population growth rate into dynamic growth
models of open economies trading with others. The standard Heckscher-Ohlin
(H-O) model of international trade has been employed to analyze the long-run
equilibria of open economies and one major issue studied has been the determi-
nants of comparative advantages in the long-run (Oniki and Uzawa (1965), Find-
lay (1970)). Oniki and Uzawa (1965) and Bardhan (1965) extended the two-sector
growth model to a two-country world, demonstrating that in a world in which the
propensities to save differ across countries, the country with the higher propen-
sity to save exports the capital intensive good in the long-run. In their seminal
work where they used a dynamic two-country, two-commodity, two-factor growth
model, Oniki and Uzawa (1965) allowed for differences in population growth rates
in order to investigate the effects of capital accumulation and labor force growth
on international equilibrium over time. It is found that given the technologi-
cal knowledge and the tastes of consumers in both countries, the volume and
terms of trade and the pattern of specialization depend upon the quantities of
productive factors endowed in both countries. Findlay (1970) extended the Oniki
and Uzawa model by adding a non-traded capital good and established the re-
lationship between trade patterns of a small three-sector economy, and saving
propensities and rates of population growth. He found that when international
capital movement is not allowed, the long-run pattern of comparative advan-
tage depends ultimately on the propensity to save and the growth rate of labor
force. Stiglitz (1970) demonstrated, in a two-country two-sector infinite horizon
world where the rates of time preference differ across countries, that factor price
equalization would not hold in the long-run. Matsuyama (1988) considered the
trade patterns of a small three-sector economy in a life cycle model.
It appears to be the general consensus of this literature that the main de-
terminant of long-run comparative advantage is the countries’ saving rates. The
models that do endogenize the saving rates attributes the difference in saving
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rates and hence long-run comparative advantage to a difference in preferences; in
particular, a difference in agents’ time discount factors among countries.
Yet, explaining trade in terms of such differences in preferences is not in
the spirit of the Heckscher-Ohlin model which suggests that trade arises mainly
because of differences in relative factor endowments rather than differences in
preferences or production technologies. One well known result of the existing
neoclassical growth models is that in the long-run all countries with identical
preferences will always converge to the same steady state, independent of initial
conditions, failing to explain enormous differences we observe in per capita income
levels across countries in the real world. Chen (1992) demonstrates by employing
a two-country two-good, two-factor growth model that once international trade
is incorporated into a neoclassical growth model, countries with different initial
per capita income levels will no longer converge to the same steady state. The
difference in initial income levels across countries persist in the long-run. Hence,
while trade may still be associated with a difference in saving rates among coun-
tries, this difference is not caused by a difference in preferences. Rather, it is
caused by a difference in initial factor proportions.
While growth models with at least two commodities and two factors of pro-
duction serve well for the analysis of the direction and magnitude of changes in
trade flows in response to changes in factor endowments, they can not show the
effects of changes in the age composition of population on relative endowments
(Sayan (2002)). Proper modeling of the effects of changes in age profile of popu-
lation on a wide range of variables such as growth, trade, sectoral adjustments,
etc., calls for multi-sector, overlapping-generations models.
Third group of studies are based on overlapping-generations general equi-
librium models that can address the effects of the changes in age composition
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of population on relative endowments. Fried (1980) used a simple overlapping-
generations model with two commodities, two generations, and one fixed factor
of production and compared steady state solutions under free trade and autarky
by assuming zero population growth rate. He showed that free trade may make
at least one country worse off relative to autarky under certain conditions. An
innovation that could make everyone in the current generation better off now and
in the future, Fried argued, may worsen the level of welfare for all agents born
after the innovation despite the fact that they have the same tastes and the same
life-cycle endowments as those agents who instituted the innovation. In other
words, if individuals have finite lives, then the gains associated with a move to a
market determined Pareto-efficient equilibrium may only be transitory, accruing
entirely to some of those alive at the time of innovation. Fried (1980) showed that
international trade increases the value of the consumption good, and the change
in relative output prices from their autarkic levels to those prevailing in the rest of
the world causes factor prices to change. If the factor price effect reduces the real
wage and the change in the value of the consumption good is not too large, future
generations may all lose from the country moving to free trade in consumption
goods.
Buiter (1981) used a deterministic model of two countries, each one of which
behaves as in a Samuelson-Diamond type of overlapping-generations model and
produces one identical good that can be used as a consumption or a capital
good in order to explain international capital movements based on differences in
time preferences. He evaluated the short-run and long-run welfare implications
of a change from a situation of trade and financial autarky to one of openness
in trade and finance. He showed that the country with a higher pure rate of
time preference (whose residents consume more in the first period of their lives
at given wage rate and interest rate) has a steady state current account deficit
if the population growth is positive, whereas the low-time preference country
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runs a current account surplus in the steady state but not necessarily outside it.
Concerning welfare, he found that the ranking of stationary utility levels under
autarky and openness is ambiguous.
Galor (1992b) was the first to formally develop the two-sector overlapping-
generations model as a counterpart to the two-sector growth model employed
for instance, by Benhabib and Nishimura (1985) and in earlier studies by Oniki
and Uzawa (1965). The model that Galor (1992b) studied is an extension of the
one-sector overlapping-generations model of Diamond (1965), where two goods
are produced: a perishable consumption good and an investment good. Azariadis
(1993) claims that distinguishing of investment goods from consumption goods
in growth theory permits the price of capital to deviate from its cost of repro-
duction which is not the case in the standard one-sector overlapping-generations
model. This deviation provides another reason for studying multi-sector mod-
els. In the single dimensional dynamic system (with a single initial condition)
that characterizes the single-sector overlapping-generations production economy,
gross substitution (individuals’ saving is an increasing function of the real re-
turn to capital) ensures the global determinacy of perfect-foresight equilibrium
(eg., Galor and Ryder (1989)). However, in the multi-dimensional dynamic sys-
tem that characterizes multi-sector models, gross substitution in consumption is
not sufficient to rule out indeterminacy. It is shown by Galor (1992b) that a
perfect-foresight two sector overlapping-generations model has a globally unique
equilibrium if the following three conditions hold:
1. gross substitutability in first and second period consumption,
2. the investment good is capital intensive, and
3. second period consumption is a normal good.
Several attempts based on Galor (1992b) study have been employed to provide
12
dynamic foundations for various characteristics of international economics.
Galor and Lin (1994) employed a two-sector overlapping-generations along
the lines of Galor (1992b), which follows the traditional two-sector growth model
where the economy is characterized by a consumption good sector and an invest-
ment good sector. Within this framework, they derived the changes in the world
relative prices and factor prices that result from shocks to technology explicitly.
Based on these fundamental relationships, the current account (domestic savings
minus domestic investment) of a small open economy which specializes in the
production of the investment good was characterized in response to the a dete-
rioration in terms of trade that is trigged by a technological shock in the world
economy. They found that factor intensities in the production sectors as well as
the nature of the shock are significant in the determination of the response of the
current account to a deterioration in the terms of trade.
Mountford (1998) utilized the Galor (1992b) model and showed that the
static implications of international trade in a two-country, two-sector, two-factor
Heckscher-Ohlin world economy model can be reversed over time if a dynamic
two period overlapping-generations structure is added to this model. Moreover,
he showed that international trade between two countries similar in every respect
except for time preferences, hence saving rates, can cause conditional convergence
and can reduce the steady state welfare in one economy without increasing the
welfare in the other.
Galor and Lin (1997) established dynamic microfoundations for the funda-
mental proposition of the most influential model of international trade theory, the
Heckscher-Ohlin model. They looked at a two-country, two-sector overlapping-
generations world where countries differ in their rate of time preferences, using
a model along the lines of the traditional two-sector growth model (e.g., Uzawa
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(1964), Srinivasan (1964), Oniki and Uzawa (1965), and Shell (1967)), and two-
sector overlapping-generations model (Galor (1992b)). Buiter (1981) established
dynamic foundations for the patterns of international lending and borrowing,
within a framework of two Diamond-type overlapping-generations economies
which differ in their rates of time preferences. Galor (1986) established dynamic
foundations for the patterns of international labor migration within the same
framework. Eaton (1987) provided the specifications for the specific factor model.
In contrast to Findlay (1970) and Matsuyama (1988), Galor and Lin (1997)
considered large countries, permitting a comprehensive general equilibrium anal-
ysis in which the terms of trade dynamics are endogenously determined. They
demonstrated that in a two-country two-sector overlapping-generations world in
which countries differ in their rates of time preference and the investment good
is capital intensive, the higher the rate of time preference, the lower the steady
state level of the capital-labor ratio and the lower the steady state relative price
of the capital intensive good.
Guillo´ (2001) employed the Galor model in order to explore the type of the
relationship between the trade balance and the terms of trade. She showed that
in most cases, the relationship between the trade balance and the terms of trade
is positive, and offered explanations concerning the negative relationship between
the terms of trade and the trade balance that can arise in large countries.
The growth literature suggests that the population growth rate is one of
the main determinants of long-run comparative advantages and a major factor
that establishes the pattern of trade for an open economy, Oniki and Uzawa
(1965), Findlay (1970). However, the overlapping-generations literature has
largely overlooked the implications of population dynamics for trade focusing
on other issues (such as current account of a small open economy, Galor and
Lin (1994); differences in time preferences, Galor and Lin (1997)) instead, by
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assuming zero population growth rate.
Only very recently, Sayan and Uyar (2001) and Sayan (2002) noted the sig-
nificance of population dynamics and showed, using numerical solutions from a
2x2x2 OLG model, that exogenously given and distinct population growth rates
may create incentives for trade but trade may not generate welfare gains for
both parties. Sayan (2005) complemented these results by showing that the same
conclusions would essentially hold, even when population growth rates decline
gradually over time.
In parallel with the endogenous growth literature, the neoclassical growth
models with diverging populations raised the possibility that countries may grow
without bounds in terms of per capita income and they may do so at different
rates. This means that international inequality of per capita incomes will not
only exist but will also get worse over time. The presence of this differences
in population growth rates across countries can give rise to this international
inequality as suggested by, Deardorff (1999). With diverging populations, the
country with the largest population growth rate comes to dominate the world
population, in the sense that its share of world population goes to one regardless
of how small it may have started. It is for this reason that other contributors
to the literature on economic growth have tended to ignore the case of diverging
populations, dismissing it as converging to a single closed economy. This calls
for a more careful care, Deardorff (1994). The possibility that population growth
rates differ across countries has been neglected in the literature, not because
it is unlikely to arise in the real world, but because it has been considered as
uninteresting.
Galor and Weil (2000) analyzed the historical evolution of the relationship be-
tween population growth, technological change and the standard of living. They
characterized the process of economic development by three distinct regimes:
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The Malthusian Regime, the Post-Malthusian Regime and the Modern Growth
Regime. In the Malthusian regime technological progress and population growth
were glacial by modern standards and income per capita was roughly constant.
There existed a positive relationship between income per capita and population
growth rate. During the post-Malthusian regime, income per capita grew al-
though not as rapidly as it would during the modern growth regime and there
existed a Malthusian (positive) relationship between income per capita and pop-
ulation growth rate. The modern growth regime is characterized by a steady
growth in both income per capita and the level of technology. There is a neg-
ative relationship between the level of output and the growth rate of popula-
tion. The highest rates of population growth are found in the poorest countries
and many rich countries have population growth rates near zero. The histori-
cal evidence suggests that the key event that separates the Malthusian and the
post-Malthusian regime is the acceleration in the pace of technological progress,
whereas the event that separates the post-Malthusian and the modern growth eras
is the demographic transition that followed the industrial revolution. Majority
of the studies in the existing literature have been oriented towards the modern
regime trying to explain the negative relation between income and population
growth.
In their 2003 study, Galor and Mountford combined the elements of endoge-
nous growth models with overlapping-generations, general equilibrium models.
They considered an overlapping-generations economy where two goods are pro-
duced using up to three factors of production: Skilled labor, unskilled labor and
land. In each of the sectors of the economy production may take place with ei-
ther an old technology or a new one. Individuals live for two periods and get
utility from consumption of the agricultural good, consumption of the manufac-
tured good and the total potential income from offsprings. It is suggested that
international trade has an asymmetrical effect on the evolution of industrial and
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non-industrial economies. While in the industrial nations the gains from trade
were directed primarily towards investment in education and growth in output
per capita, a significant portion of the gains from trade in non-industrial nations
was channeled towards population growth.
Galor and Mountford (2003) argue that the rapid expansion of international
trade in the second phase of the industrial revolution has played a major role
in the timing of demographic transitions across countries and has therefore been
a significant determinant of the distribution of world population and a prime
cause of the divergence in income levels across countries in the last two centuries.
The argument goes as follows: In the second phase of the industrial revolution,
international trade enhanced the specialization of industrial economies in the
production of industrial, skilled intensive goods. The associated rise in the de-
mand for skilled labor has induced a gradual investment in the quality of the
population in industrial economies, expediting a demographic transition, stimu-
lating technological progress and further enhancing the comparative advantage of
these economies in the production of skilled intensive goods. In the non-industrial
economies, international trade has generated an incentive to specialize in the pro-
duction of unskilled intensive, non-industrial goods. The absence of significant
demand for human capital has provided limited incentives to invest in the quality
of the population and the gains from trade have been utilized primarily for a fur-
ther increase in the size of the population, rather than the income of the existing
population. The demographic transition in these non-industrial economies has
been significantly delayed, further increasing their relative abundance of unskilled
labor, enhancing their comparative disadvantage in the production of skilled in-
tensive goods and delaying the process of development. The authors suggested
that sustained differences in income per capita and population growth across
countries may be attributed to the contrasting role that international trade had
on industrial and non-industrial nations.
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In this study, we consider the standard set-up of the static Heckscher-Ohlin
(H-O) model to examine the implications of the long-run effect of population
differentials on trade. As described in Salvatore (2001), the static H-O framework,
in its standard form is characterized by the following assumptions:
1. There are two countries, two commodities and two factors of production.
2. Both countries use the same technology in production.
3. One commodity is capital-intensive and the other is labor-intensive. More
precisely, the capital-labor ratio (K/L) is higher for the capital-intensive
commodity than for the labor-intensive commodity.
4. Both commodities are produced under constant returns to scale in both
countries.
5. There is incomplete specialization in production in both counties. That is,
even with free trade both countries continue to produce both commodities.
6. Demand preferences are identical in both countries.
7. There is perfect competition in both commodities and factor markets in
both countries.
8. There is perfect factor mobility within each country but no international
factor movements.
9. There are no transportation costs, tariffs, or other obstructions to the free
flow of international trade.
10. All resources are fully employed in both countries.
11. International trade between the two countries is balanced.
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The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem states that a country will export the commodity
whose production requires the intensive use of the country’s relatively abundant
and cheap factor and import the commodity whose production requires the in-
tensive use of the country’s relatively scarce and expensive factor. Hence, the
H-O framework isolates the difference in relative factor abundances (or factor en-
dowments) as the basic determinant of comparative advantage and international
trade. More precisely, the difference in relative factor abundances and prices is
the cause of the pre-trade differences in relative commodity prices between two
countries.
Within this static set-up, relative factor endowments of countries are different
and do not change over time. We extended this static set-up to a dynamic
one by imposing an overlapping-generations structure to the model under non-
stationary populations so as to allow factor supplies to be determined within the
model itself. This results in a generation of a replica of the static H-O framework
at each period, while considering the evolution of the main factors of production
through differential population dynamics that we introduced. In other words,
inequality of population growth serves as the driving force behind the changes
in relative factor endowments at each period. In fact, differences in population
growth rates not only affect the growth of labor supply but also that of capital
stock through the savings of the young.
According to Salvatore (2001), H-O model is useful in explaining international
trade in raw materials, agricultural products, and labor-intensive manufacturers,
which is a large component of the trade between developing and developed coun-
tries.
The results in the present study link up well with the discussion in Galor
and Mountford (2003), where the authors suggest that the observed variation in
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the speed of demographic transition between industrial and non-industrial na-
tions can be explained with the historically observed differences in the way they
have distributed their respective gains from trade. In their model, Galor and
Mountford consider endogenous fertility and technological change, and distin-
guish between unskilled and skilled labor whose paths, they argue, have differed
across industrial and non-industrial nations due to the use by the former of gains
from trade in education, and hence, in improving skill levels of labor. The present
study, on the other hand, assumes away technological change and human capital
formation (and hence different skill levels of labor) to highlight the effects of ex-
ogenous differences in population growth on trade patterns within a set-up that
is completely H-O in spirit.2 While their purposes and hence the model assump-
tions employed in the two studies differ, our finding that the differences in relative
endowments of capital and labor induced by the differing speeds of demographic
transition alone will not be sufficient to render trade mutually beneficial in the
long-run is not in contradiction with the arguments in Galor and Mountford.
2Deardorff (1999) addresses a related problem to Galor and Mountford (2003) by studying
the effect of diverging population growth rates on worldwide distribution of income based on
exogenous population growth rates as in the present study.
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CHAPTER III
THE BASIC MODEL
The model used is an infinite horizon two-period overlapping-generations
model with perfect foresight. In this model, one young (y) and one old (o)
generation exist at any point in time. Individuals in this overlapping-generations
economy work when young and are retired when old. The young decide on cur-
rent consumption and anticipated old age consumption based on their preferences
and lifetime resources. Preferences of an individual living in this economy are of
the Cobb-Douglas type. The lifetime resources of young consist of wage income
only, whereas those of old consist of savings accumulated when young plus income
earned on their savings. No bequests nor any net intergenerational transfers are
allowed in this model. That is, old spend all their income on consumption.
On the supply side, two commodities are produced in a competitive environ-
ment, by using labor and capital under constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
type production technologies that are different across commodities. Labor is sup-
plied by the current young, whereas capital is supplied by the current elderly,
corresponding to the savings of the last period’s young generation.
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As differently from overlapping-generations general equilibrium models in such
studies as Galor (1992b) and Azariadis (1993), our model allows good 1 to be
used for consumption as well as investment purposes. While this makes the model
relatively more realistic, it also adds to the complexity of the utility maximization
problem, since the consumers are now required to decide how much to consume
of each good every period.
3.1 Consumption and Saving
3.1.1 Utility Maximization Problem
At every period t, a generation made up of Nt individuals is born. Popula-
tion grows at the rate n so that Nt = (1 + n)Nt−1. Individuals live for two
periods. They work in the first period and retire in the second period. Indi-
viduals born at time t are characterized by their intertemporal utility function
u(c1yt, c2yt, c1ot+1, c2ot+1) defined over nonnegative consumption bundles during
the first and the second periods of their lives. The individual’s utility is of the
Cobb-Douglas similarly to Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) where a one-commodity
Cobb-Douglas utility is used, and to Sayan and Uyar (2001) and Sayan (2005)
where a two-commodity Cobb-Douglas utility is employed.
u(c1yt, c2yt, c1ot+1, c2ot+1) = (c
θ
1ytc
1−θ
2yt )
µ(cθ1ot+1c
1−θ
2ot+1)
1−µ, (3.1)
where 0 < θ < 1 and 0 < µ < 1. For all periods t, individuals born and living
the first period of their lives at time t inelastically supply a fixed amount of
labor, l¯; earn labor income at the competitive wage rate, wt, and decide on how
to allocate it between first period consumption of good 1 and 2 (c1yt,c2yt), and
savings, st. Given the price, pt, of the consumption good (good 2) in terms of the
22
investment-consumption good (good 1) at time t,
st = wtl¯ − (c1yt + ptc2yt). (3.2)
Individuals save by purchasing the investment-consumption good (good 1) which
is the only store of value in the economy. Savings bring interest earnings at
the rate of rt+1 the next period. In the second period, the individual retires
and consumes c1ot+1 units of good 1, and c2ot+1 units of good 2 by spending
all his capital income from previous period’s savings. Hence, the second period
consumption of an individual born at time t is:
c1ot+1 + pt+1c2ot+1 = (1 + rt+1)st. (3.3)
Plugging the expression of st from on (3.2) into (3.3) and arranging terms yields
the budget constraint:
c1yt + ptc2yt +
1
1 + rt+1
(c1ot+1 + pt+1c2ot+1) = wtl¯. (3.4)
This condition states that the present value of the individual’s life time consump-
tion equals his initial wealth (which is zero) plus the present value of life time
labor income (which is wt l¯). Hence, the individual’s problem can be formulated
as follows:
max (cθ1ytc
1−θ
2yt )
µ(cθ1ot+1c
1−θ
2ot+1)
1−µ
subject to
c1yt + ptc2yt +
1
1 + rt+1
(c1ot+1 + pt+1c2ot+1) = wtl¯
c1yt, c2yt, c1ot+1, c2ot+1 ≥ 0
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Now, we can write down the following Lagrangian for the individual’s problem.
L = (cθ1ytc
1−θ
2yt )
µ(cθ1ot+1c
1−θ
2ot+1)
1−µ
+ λ
[
wtl¯ − (c1yt + ptc2yt +
1
1 + rt+1
(c1ot+1 + pt+1c2ot+1))
]
, (3.5)
where λ is the marginal utility of consumption which is positive.
The first order conditions are:
µθcµθ−11yt c
µ(1−θ)
2yt c
θ(1−µ)
1ot+1 c
(1−θ)(1−µ)
2ot+1 = λ, (3.6)
µ(1− θ)c
µ(1−θ)−1
2yt c
µθ
1ytc
θ(1−µ)
1ot+1 c
(1−θ)(1−µ)
2ot+1 = λpt, (3.7)
θ(1− µ)c
θ(1−µ)−1
1ot+1 c
µθ
1ytc
µ(1−θ)
2yt c
(1−θ)(1−µ)
2ot+1 =
λ
1 + rt+1
, (3.8)
(1− θ)(1− µ)c
(1−θ)(1−µ)−1
2ot+1 c
µθ
1ytc
µ(1−θ)
2yt c
θ(1−µ)
1ot+1 =
λpt+1
1 + rt+1
. (3.9)
Substituting (3.6) into (3.7) yields
c2yt =
(
1− θ
θ
)(
1
pt
)
c1yt. (3.10)
Substituting (3.8) into (3.9) yields
c2ot+1 =
(
1− θ
θ
)(
1
pt+1
)
c1ot+1. (3.11)
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Substituting (3.6) into (3.8) yields
c1ot+1 =
(
1− µ
µ
)
(1 + rt+1)c1yt. (3.12)
Substituting (3.7) into (3.9) yields
c2ot+1 =
(
1− µ
µ
)(
pt
pt+1
)
(1 + rt+1)c2yt. (3.13)
Hence, writing all consumption variables in terms of first period consumption of
good 1, c1yt requires finding c2ot+1 in terms of c1yt. Substituting (3.12) into (3.11)
yields
c2ot+1 =
(
1− µ
µ
)(
1− θ
θ
)(
1
pt+1
)
(1 + rt+1)c1yt. (3.14)
Substituting (3.10), (3.12), (3.14) into the budget constraint, (3.4), yields
c1yt = µθwtl¯. (3.15)
Substituting (3.15) into (3.10) yields
c2yt = µ(1− θ)
wtl¯
pt
. (3.16)
Substituting (3.15) into (3.12) yields
c1ot+1 = (1− µ)θ(1 + rt+1)wtl¯. (3.17)
Substituting (3.15) into (3.14) yields
c2ot+1 = (1− µ)(1− θ)(1 + rt+1)
wtl¯
pt+1
. (3.18)
An examination of (3.15) through (3.18) reveals that the ratio of the optimal
amount of one good to the other is independent of the level of income at any
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given price ratio. For instance, during the first period, the ratio of good 1’s
consumption to that of good’s 2 is
c1yt
c2yt
=
(
θ
1− θ
)
pt. (3.19)
Similarly, the second period consumption proportion of both goods is
c1ot+1
c2ot+1
=
(
θ
1− θ
)
pt+1. (3.20)
The same thing can also be shown to hold for consumption ratios across periods.
Hence, the demand pattern in this model is homothetic, due to the Cobb-Douglas
type preferences.
3.1.2 Parameters of the Utility Function
Examining (3.19) and (3.20), we notice that the nominal consumption expendi-
ture ratios within each period depend on parameter θ. So, the individual decides
on how much to spend on good 1 and good 2 during each period of his life on the
basis of θ. Since
d
dθ
(
θ
1− θ
)
=
1
(1− θ)2
> 0, (3.21)
the higher the value of θ, the higher the expenditures on good 1 (the consumption-
investment good) will be.
The fraction of income the individual consumes in the first period of his life
is
c1yt + ptc2yt
wtl¯
=
µθwt l¯ + µ(1− θ)wt l¯
wtl¯
= µθ + µ(1− θ)
= µ. (3.22)
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Thus, the fraction of income saved is (1 − µ). The fraction of income spent on
good 1 during the first period is
c1t
wtl¯
=
µθwtl¯
wtl¯
= µθ, (3.23)
and the fraction of income spent on good 2 during the first period is
c2t
wt l¯
=
µ(1− θ)wt l¯
wtl¯
= µ(1− θ). (3.24)
Therefore, µ determines the saving rate of this economy. In particular (1− µ) is
the saving rate, which is constant and exogenously given. θ, on the other hand,
determines the pattern of first period consumption. In particular, θ specifies
the allocation of consumption expenditures during the first period, over the two
goods.
3.2 Production
3.2.1 Profit Maximization Problem
Both the investment-consumption good and the consumption good are produced
according to constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production technologies by
using capital, K, and Labor, L. The output of the good 1, and that of good 2 at
time t, X1t and X2t, are given by
X1t = K
α
1tL
1−α
1t , (3.25)
X2t = K
β
2tL
1−β
2t . (3.26)
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In per capita terms
x1t = k
α
1tl
1−α
1t , (3.27)
x2t = k
β
2tl
1−β
2t , (3.28)
where
xit =
Xit
Nt
,
kit =
Kit
Nt
,
lit =
Lit
Nt
, for i = 1, 2.
lit is the proportion of labor force employed in sector i, at time t. Total labor
supplied at time t is
Lt = Nt l¯,
where l¯ is exogenously given and represents the level of labor supplied by an
individual. When l¯ = 1, the per capita and the per worker transformations of the
output functions are the same. Thus, lit ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of the labor
force employed in sector i at time t. Clearance of factor markets requires that
k1t + k2t = kt, (3.29)
and
l1t + l2t = l¯. (3.30)
The properties of the sectoral production technologies in association with the
competitive nature of the economy imply that the demand for labor and capital
in each sector is determined by first order conditions for profit maximization.
If labor and capital are perfectly mobile across sectors and if both goods are
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produced, then
rt = αk
α−1
1t l
1−α
1t
= ptβk
β−1
2t l
1−β
2t , (3.31)
wt = (1− α)k
α
1tl
−α
1t
= pt(1− β)k
β
2tl
−β
2t . (3.32)
Where rt is the rental rate on capital, wt is the wage rate, and pt is the price
of the consumption good (good 2) in terms of the consumption-investment good
(good 1), at time t. The consumption-investment good (good 1) is the numeraire.
Side by side division of (3.31) and (3.32), results in
k1t =
(
α
1− α
)(
1− β
β
)
l1t
l2t
k2t. (3.33)
Using (3.31) and (3.33), we obtain
k1t = p
1
α−β
t
(
β
α
) β
α−β
(
1− β
1− α
) 1−β
α−β
l1t. (3.34)
Now, rearranging terms of (3.33) to obtain the expression of k2t in terms of k1t,
and plugging in the expression for k1t given by (3.34) yields
k2t = p
1
α−β
t
(
β
α
) α
α−β
(
1− β
1− α
) 1−α
α−β
l2t. (3.35)
Let
ǫ =
(
β
α
) β
α−β
(
1− β
1− α
) 1−β
α−β
, (3.36)
and
δ =
(
β
α
) α
α−β
(
1− β
1− α
) 1−α
α−β
. (3.37)
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Hence,
k1t = ǫl1tp
1
α−β
t , (3.38)
and
k2t = δl2tp
1
α−β
t . (3.39)
Now, substituting (3.38) and (3.39) in the factor market clearing conditions;
(3.29) and (3.30), yields


ǫl1tp
1
α−β
t + δl2tp
1
α−β
t = kt
l1t + l2t = l¯.
(3.40)
Thus,
l1t =
δl¯
δ − ǫ
−
1
δ − ǫ
ktp
1
β−α
t , (3.41)
l2t = −
ǫl¯
δ − ǫ
+
1
δ − ǫ
ktp
1
β−α
t . (3.42)
Now, substituting (3.41) and (3.42) in (3.38) and (3.39) respectively, we get
k1t = −
ǫ
δ − ǫ
kt +
δǫl¯
δ − ǫ
p
1
α−β
t , (3.43)
k2t =
δ
δ − ǫ
kt −
δǫl¯
δ − ǫ
p
1
α−β
t . (3.44)
Now, using (3.31) and (3.38) the rental rate is given by
rt = αǫ
α−1p
α−1
α−β
t
= βδβ−1p
α−1
α−β
t , (3.45)
and using (3.32) and (3.39) the wage rate is given by
wt = (1− α)ǫ
αp
α
α−β
t
= (1− β)δβp
α
α−β
t . (3.46)
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The expressions for output of good 1 is therefore determined by substituting
(3.38) into (3.27) giving
x1t = l1tǫ
αp
α
α−β
t , (3.47)
and that of output of good 2 is determined by substituting (3.39) into (3.28)
resulting in
x2t = l2tδ
βp
β
α−β
t . (3.48)
Substituting (3.41) into (3.47), we get an expression for the output of good 1 in
terms of the per capita capital and price ratio as follows
x1t =
(
δl¯
δ − ǫ
−
1
δ − ǫ
ktp
1
β−α
t
)
ǫαp
α
α−β
t . (3.49)
Similarly, substituting (3.42) into (3.48), we get that expression of the output of
good 2 in terms of the per capita capital and the price ratio as follows,
x2t =
(
−
ǫl¯
δ − ǫ
+
1
δ − ǫ
ktp
1
β−α
t
)
δβp
β
α−β
t . (3.50)
3.2.2 Parameters of the Production Technology
The sectoral constant returns to scale production technology is solely determined
by the parameter α for sector 1 and β for sector 2. Since
α =
∂x1t(k1t, l1t)
∂k1t
k1t
x1t
, (3.51)
and
β =
∂x2t(k2t, l2t)
∂k2t
k2t
x2t
, (3.52)
(3.51) and (3.52) respectively give the elasticities of output of good 1 and good
2 with respect to capital used. So, α (β) shows the change in output of good
1 (good 2) to result from a marginal change in capital used. Similarly, (1 − α)
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and (1 − β) gives respectively, the elasticities of output of good 1 and good 2
with respect to labor used. Alternatively, these parameters can be viewed as the
shares of respective factors of production in total cost.
3.3 The Autarky Economy
A perfect-foresight equilibrium is a sequence {kt, pt}
∞
t=0 that clears the goods’
markets at every period t while satisfying the dynamics of the capital stock at
time t + 1. The individual saves only during the first period of life. During the
second period of life, the individual gets old and retires to consume all his wealth.
The fraction of income saved during the first period of life is (1 − µ). Thus the
evolution of the per capita capital is governed by
kt+1 =
(1− µ)wtl¯
(1 + n)
. (3.53)
The clearance of the goods’ market in period t requires that per capita supply of
each good be equal to its respective per capita demand. Hence, for good 1
x1t + kt = c1yt +
1
(1 + n)
c1ot + (1 + n)kt+1, (3.54)
and for good 2
x2t = c2yt +
1
(1 + n)
c2ot. (3.55)
Applying Walras’ Law allows us to focus on only one of the goods markets. So,
we consider the market clearance condition for the consumption good (good 2).
Substituting (3.16) and (3.18) at t, in (3.55) yields
x2t = µ(1− θ)
wtl¯
pt
+
(1− µ)(1− θ)
1 + n
(1 + rt)
wt−1l¯
pt
. (3.56)
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Substituting (3.45) and (3.46) at time t− 1 in (3.56) yields
x2t = µ(1− θ)(1− β)l¯δ
βp
β
α−β
t
+
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)l¯
1 + n
(1 + βδβ−1p
α−1
α−β
t )
1
pt
δβp
α
α−β
t−1 . (3.57)
Substituting (3.48) in (3.57) and rearranging terms yield
l2t = µ(1− θ)(1− β)l¯ +
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)l¯p
α
α−β
t−1 p
−α
α−β
t
+
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)βl¯δβ−1p
α
α−β
t−1 p
−1
α−β
t . (3.58)
Rearranging terms of (3.58) yields
l2t = µ(1− θ)(1− β)l¯
+
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)l¯
(
pt−1
pt
) α
α−β
+
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)βl¯δβ−1p
α
α−β
t−1 p
−1
α−β
t (3.59)
Remembering (3.42)
l2t = −
ǫl¯
δ − ǫ
+
1
δ − ǫ
ktp
1
β−α
t (3.60)
and substituting it in (3.59) leads to
kt = {µ(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ) + ǫ)} l¯p
1
α−β
t (3.61)
+
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)l¯p
α
α−β
t−1 p
1−α
α−β
t
+
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)βl¯δβ−1p
α
α−β
t−1 .
Let
φ1 = {µ(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ) + ǫ)} l¯, (3.62)
φ2 =
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)l¯ (3.63)
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φ3 =
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)βl¯δβ−1. (3.64)
Hence,
kt = φ1p
1
α−β
t + φ2p
α
α−β
t−1 p
1−α
α−β
t + φ3p
α
α−β
t−1 . (3.65)
Now substituting the wage rate given by (3.46) into per capita capital dynamics
given by (3.53) yields
kt+1 =
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− β)l¯δβp
α
α−β
t . (3.66)
Let
φ4 =
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− β)l¯δβ . (3.67)
Thus,
kt+1 = φ4p
α
α−β
t . (3.68)
Writing (3.65) at time t+ 1 gives
kt+1 = φ1p
1
α−β
t+1 + φ2p
α
α−β
t p
1−α
α−β
t+1 + φ3p
α
α−β
t . (3.69)
Now substituting (3.68) into (3.69) gives a nonlinear difference equation in terms
of prices only that characterizes the dynamics of this economy:
(φ4 − φ3)p
α
α−β
t = φ1p
1
α−β
t+1 + φ2p
α
α−β
t p
1−α
α−β
t+1 . (3.70)
The dynamics of this model can also be characterized by a single nonlinear differ-
ence equation in terms of per capita capital only. The per capita capital dynamics
given by (3.68) can be rewritten for pt in terms of kt+1, thus
pt =
(
1
φ4
)α−β
α
k
α−β
α
t+1 . (3.71)
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Hence, using (3.71) and substituting in (3.65), one can obtain
(φ4 − φ3)kt = φ1φ
α−1
α
4 k
1
α
t+1 + φ2φ
α−1
α
4 ktk
1−α
α
t+1 . (3.72)
3.3.1 The Dynamic Equilibrium for the Autarky Economy
The dynamics of this economy can either be characterized by (3.70) or by (3.72).
Considering only the price ratio dynamics governing this system in (3.70), we can
start by solving for the steady state price ratio and determine the steady state
magnitudes of the rest of variables. Now, (3.70) can be rewritten in such a way
to facilitate the determination of the equilibrium price ratio. Since
φ4 − φ3 = φ1

p
1
α−β
t+1
p
α
α−β
t

+ φ2p 1−αα−βt+1
= φ1

p
1
α−β
t+1
p
α
α−β
t



p
−α
α−β
t+1
p
−α
α−β
t+1

+ φ2p 1−αα−βt+1
=

φ1
(
pt+1
pt
) α
α−β
+ φ2

 p 1−αα−βt+1 ,
it follows that
pt+1 =

 φ4 − φ3
φ1
(
pt+1
pt
) α
α−β + φ2


α−β
1−α
. (3.73)
Now, an equilibrium price ratio ps (steady state value) is such that pt+1 = pt = ps
and satisfies (3.73). Then,
ps =
(
φ4 − φ3
φ1 + φ2
)α−β
1−α
. (3.74)
Letting
Φ =
φ4 − φ3
φ1 + φ2
, (3.75)
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one obtains
ps = Φ
α−β
1−α . (3.76)
Similarly, considering (3.72) we can easily proceed to solve for the steady state
magnitude of per capita capital ks. Rearranging terms of (3.72), we have,
φ4 − φ3 = φ1φ
α−1
α
4

k
1
α
t+1
kt

+ φ2φα−1α4 k 1−ααt+1
= φ1φ
α−1
α
4

k
1
α
t+1
kt


(
kt+1
kt+1
)
+ φ2φ
α−1
α
4 k
1−α
α
t+1
= φ
α−1
α
4
(
φ1
(
kt+1
kt
)
+ φ2
)
k
1−α
α
t+1 .
Hence,
kt+1 = φ4

 φ4 − φ3
φ1
(
kt+1
kt
)
+ φ2


α
1−α
. (3.77)
Now, an equilibrium ks (steady state magnitude) is such that kt+1 = kt = ks and
satisfies (3.77). Then,
ks = φ4
(
φ4 − φ3
φ1 + φ2
) α
1−α
= φ4Φ
α
1−α . (3.78)
So, it is clear that the dynamics of this economy where production and utility
are of the Cobb-Douglas type, are characterized by a single nonlinear difference
equation in terms of either price ratio or per capita capital. This follows from
the fact that savings are not affected by the rental rate (Galor (1992a)) making
it possible for either of the difference equations characterizing the dynamics to
be easily solved for the steady state magnitudes of relevant variables.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium price ratio, ps, for this perfect foresight
overlapping-generations general equilibrium model with constant returns to scale
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production exists and is unique for all values of −1 < n, l¯ > 0 and for any given
values of α, β, µ, θ that lie strictly between 0 and 1 such that α 6= β and initial
per capita capital magnitude allowing for the attainment of the transition path.
Proof:
The long-run closed form solution given in (3.74) shows that ps is unique. How-
ever, existence must be assured by showing that ps is positive for any α, β, µ, θ,
n and l¯.
For ps to be positive, Φ must be positive. Φ =
φ4−φ3
φ1+φ2
> 0 if and only if φ4−φ3 > 0
and φ1 + φ2 > 0 or φ4 − φ3 < 0 and φ1 + φ2 < 0.
Now, φ4 − φ3 > 0 ⇔
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− β)l¯δβ >
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)βl¯(δ − ǫ)δβ−1
δβ > (1− θ)β(δ − ǫ)δβ−1
1 > (1− θ)β(1−
ǫ
δ
)
1 > (1− θ)β
(
1−
(
1− β
1− α
)(
α
β
))
1 >
(1− θ)(β − α)
(1− α)
(1− α) + α(1− θ) > (1− θ)β
1− αθ
1− θ
> β.
Since 1−αθ
1−θ
> 1, and 0 < β < 1,
1− αθ
1− θ
> β
holds for any given α, β, and θ. Thus φ4− φ3 > 0 for any given α, β, µ, θ, n and
l¯. Similarly φ1 + φ2 > 0 can be shown as follows:
37
φ1 + φ2 > 0 ⇔
µ(1− θ)(1− β)l¯(δ − ǫ) + ǫl¯ +
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)l¯(δ − ǫ) > 0
(δ − ǫ)
(
µ(1− θ)(1− β) +
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)
)
+ ǫ > 0(
δ
ǫ
− 1
)
(1− θ)(1− β)
(
µ+
1− µ
1 + n
)
> −1
(
β − α
α
)
(1− θ)
(
1 + µn
1 + n
)
> −1
−
1 + n
(1 + µn)(1− θ)
<
β − α
α
1−
1 + n
(1 + µn)(1− θ)
<
β
α
.
Since
1 + n
(1 + µn)(1− θ)
> 1,
1−
1 + n
(1 + µn)(1− θ)
< 0.
Given that β
α
> 0,
β
α
> 1−
1 + n
(1 + µn)(1− θ)
holds for any given values of α, β, µ, θ, l¯, and n.
Hence φ1 + φ2 > 0 for any given α, β, µ, θ, n and l¯.
Therefore, Φ > 0 and hence ps > 0 for any given α, β, µ, θ, n and l¯, where
0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1, 0 < µ < 1, 0 < θ < 1, 0 < l¯, and −1 < n.
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It must be noted that for (3.74) to hold, it suffices to set α 6= β, without
specifying whether α > β or α < β. In other words, it is not necessary to
restrict α to be greater than β so as to let the production of good 1 be relatively
capital intensive. This is an important finding complementing the restrictive set
of conditions put forth by Galor (1992a) who states that the perfect-foresight
equilibrium of a two sector overlapping-generations model is globally unique if all
of the following hold:
1. the investment good is capital intensive,
2. first and second period consumption are gross substitutes (i.e., the saving
is an increasing function of the real rate of return to capital), and
3. second period consumption is a normal good.
Our solutions to the model we develop by allowing the investment good to serve
for consumption purposes as well, demonstrate therefore that neither the first nor
the second item is required to guarantee the existence of a unique global steady
state solution.
3.3.2 Long-run Closed Form Solutions for the Autarky
Economy
Now, given the price ratio ps we can easily proceed to find out the closed form
solutions for the steady state magnitudes of other model variables. Alternatively,
one can use (3.68) to obtain the steady state magnitude ks of per capita capital
and proceed to solve for other variables:
kt+1 − kt = φ4p
α
α−β
t − kt. (3.79)
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The steady state magnitude ks is such that kt+1 − kt = 0. Hence,
ks = φ4p
α
α−β
s . (3.80)
Thus, the steady state per capita capital is
ks = φ4
(
φ4 − φ3
φ1 + φ2
) α
1−α
= φ4Φ
α
1−α (3.81)
Using (3.46), one can obtain the following expression for ws,
ws = (1− α)ǫ
αp
α−1
α−β
s . (3.82)
Substituting (3.76) into (3.82), we easily obtain the expression for the steady
state wage rate ws,
ws = (1− α)ǫ
αΦ
α
α−β . (3.83)
Using (3.45), we can obtain the following expression for rs
rs = αǫ
α−1p
α−1
α−β
s . (3.84)
Substituting (3.76) into (3.84), we obtain the steady state rental rate as
rs = αǫ
α−1 1
Φ
. (3.85)
The steady state expression for the output of good 1 is determined by substituting
(3.76) and (3.81) into (3.49) giving
x1s =
δl¯
δ − ǫ
ǫαΦ
β
1−α +
1
δ − ǫ
δβφ4Φ
2α−1
1−α . (3.86)
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The steady state expression for the output of good 2 is determined by substituting
(3.76) and (3.81) into (3.50) giving
x2s = −
ǫl¯
δ − ǫ
δβΦ
β
1−α +
1
δ − ǫ
δβφ4Φ
α+β−1
1−α . (3.87)
The steady state real consumption by young can be obtained once the steady
state wage rate is determined. Using (3.15), we have
c1ys = µθwsl¯. (3.88)
Hence, substituting (3.83) into (3.88) yields
c1ys = µθ(1− α)l¯ǫ
αΦ
α
1−α . (3.89)
(3.16) evaluated at the steady state leads to
c2ys = µ(1− θ)
ws l¯
ps
. (3.90)
Substituting (3.76) and (3.83) into (3.90) yields
c2ys = µ(1− θ)(1− α)l¯ǫ
αΦ
β
1−α . (3.91)
The steady state real consumption by old can be determined once the steady
state price ratio, the steady state wage rate and the steady state rental rate are
determined. Using (3.17), we have
c1os = (1− µ)θ(1 + rs)ws l¯. (3.92)
Substituting (3.83) into (3.92), we get
c1os = (1− µ)θ(1− α)l¯ǫ
α(1 + αǫα−1
1
Φ
)Φ
α
1−α . (3.93)
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Using (3.18), we have
c2os = (1− µ)(1− θ)(1 + rs)
wsl¯
ps
. (3.94)
Substituting (3.76) and (3.83) into (3.94), we get
c2os = (1− µ)(1− θ)(1− α)l¯ǫ
α(1 + αǫα−1
1
Φ
)Φ
β
1−α . (3.95)
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CHAPTER IV
THE BASIC MODEL AT
WORK
In order to visualize the dynamics of our model economy, a numerical exercise
is worth undertaking. Such an exercise is likely to produce results that help
us understand the significance and implications for growth of different initial
conditions and parameter values. We begin by assigning numerical values to
parameters and consider a set of initial magnitudes for per capita capital and
price ratios. The numerical solutions enable us to observe paths that different
variables would follow over time until the steady state magnitudes analytically
derived in the previous chapter are reached (asymptotically with a convergence
margin smaller than 10−6). We also discuss the possibility of non-convergence
observed under certain initial values and try to generalize our results to establish
conditions for such non-convergence. More precisely, we have noticed that for
some initial values the economy stays stack in its initial variable magnitudes,
but once the transition path is reached, the long-run equilibrium magnitudes are
reachable.
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Production parameters are chosen such that the production of commodity 1 is
relatively capital-intensive, and that of commodity 2 is relatively labor-intensive
as suggested by Galor (1992b). Hence, the condition
K1t
L1t
>
K2t
L2t
,
must be satisfied at any time t, where Kit and Lit for i = 1, 2, are respectively the
amounts of capital and the labor employed in the production of good i. Because
markets are competitive, both capital and labor earn their marginal products.
Since capital and labor are perfectly mobile across sectors, the rental rate and
the wage rate are equalized across sectors. Hence, marginal product of each factor
in sector 1 needs to be equated to its marginal product in sector 2.
So,
∂X1t(K1t, L1t)
∂K1t
=
∂X2t(K2t, L2t)
∂K2t
,
⇒ αKα−11t L
1−α
1t = ptβK
β−1
2t L
1−β
2t . (4.1)
Similarly,
∂X1t(K1t, L1t)
∂L1t
=
∂X2t(K2t, L2t)
∂L2t
,
⇒ (1− α)Kα1tL
−α
1t = pt(1− β)K
β
2tL
−β
2t . (4.2)
Side-by-side division of (4.2) and (4.1) yields
K1t
L1t
=
(
α
β
)(
1− β
1− α
)
K2t
L2t
. (4.3)
In order to have
K1t
L1t
>
K2t
L2t
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Table 4.1: Autarky Model Parameter Values
α β µ θ l¯
0.50 0.30 0.80 0.40 1
holding at any time t, we need to have
(
α
β
)(
1− β
1− α
)
> 1
⇒ α > β. (4.4)
Therefore, having (4.4) satisfied guarantees that sector 1 is relatively capital
intensive while sector 2 is relatively labor intensive in line with Galor (1992b).
The parameter values chosen for numerical solution of the model are displayed in
Table 4.1.
The population growth rate is taken to be n = 0.16, the equivalent of a 0.05
annual population growth rate, compounded over a 30 years period. By these
numbers, the share of capital in the production of good 1 is 0.50 and that in
the production of good 2 is 0.30. In a study conducted by Chenery (1986), the
estimates of capital share vary considerably across countries ranging from 26%
for Hundaras to more than 60% for Singapore. He also derived an estimate for
the unweighted average of capital share for industrial countries, which is found
to be about 30%. The fraction of wage income that is saved is assumed to be
0.20 following Loayza, Lopez and Serven (1998) who found that the unweighted
average of the private saving rate for industrial countries is about 20%. These
values imply that the fraction of wage income spent on first period consumption
of good 1 is 0.32, and the fraction of income spent on first period consumption
of good 2 is 0.48.
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These parameter values imply the following values for φ1 to φ4. φ1 = 1.2192;
φ2 = −0.0624; φ3 = −0.0254; φ4 = 0.1059.
The resulting dynamics can be analyzed by considering (3.70). Figure 4.1
shows pt+1 as a function of pt. This is derived from (3.70) as follows: First
remembering (3.70), we have
(φ4 − φ3)p
α
α−β
t = φ1p
1
α−β
t+1 + φ2p
α
α−β
t p
1−α
α−β
t+1 .
We can rewrite this as
(
φ4 − φ3 − φ2p
1−α
α−β
t+1
)
p
α
α−β
t = φ1p
1
α−β
t+1 ,
or,
pt =

 φ1p
1
α−β
t+1
φ4 − φ3 − φ2p
1−α
α−β
t+1


α−β
α
=

φ4 − φ3 − φ2p
1−α
α−β
t+1
φ1p
1
α−β
t+1


β−α
α
=
(
φ4 − φ3
φ1
p
1
β−α
t+1 −
φ2
φ1
p
α
β−α
t+1
)β−α
α
. (4.5)
The relationship between pt+1 and pt captured through (4.5) is plotted in Fig-
ure 4.1 for given values of parameters.
At the point of intersection between pt+1 and the 45-degree line, pt+1 equals pt.
It is clear that there is a unique equilibrium level of pt (aside from p = 0), which
we denote by ps. The steady state price ratio ps is globally stable: wherever the
price ratio p starts (other than at 0), it converges to ps. Suppose, for example,
that the initial price ratio is p0 which is less than ps (i.e., to the left of ps). Because
pt+1 is greater than pt when pt is less than ps, p1 is greater than p0. In the next
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Figure 4.1: Dynamics of the Price Ratio
period, p1 becomes the current period price. (4.5) indicates that the price must
continue to increase. Since p2 6= p1, p1 can not be equal to ps. Furthermore,
since p2 > p1, p1 must lie to the left of ps, or p1 < ps. So, p0 < p1 < ps
implying that the movement from p0 to p1 represents a part way step towards ps.
This process is repeated each period, and p converges smoothly to ps. A similar
analysis applies for initial price ratios greater than ps such as p
′
0 (i.e., to the right
of ps). Hence, the initial price ratio affects only the transition path, but not the
equilibrium magnitudes. Hence, the steady state price ratio exists and is unique
as analytically shown in the previous chapter. Moreover, the equilibrium price
sequence is unique and stationary.
Similarly, analyzing the model economy’s dynamics through (3.72) results in
the same conclusions in terms of per capita capital as it is displayed in Figure 4.2.
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The relationship between kt+1 and kt plotted in Figure 4.2 is derived through
the following steps. Remembering (3.72)
(φ4 − φ3)kt = φ1φ
α−1
α
4 k
1
α
t+1 + φ2φ
α−1
α
4 ktk
1−α
α
t+1 . (4.6)
Rewriting the above as
(
φ4 − φ3 − φ2φ
α−1
α
4 k
1−α
α
t+1
)
kt = φ1φ
α−1
α
4 k
1
α
t+1,
one obtains
kt =

 φ1φ
α−1
α
4 k
1
α
t+1
φ4 − φ3 − φ2φ
α−1
α
4 k
1−α
α
t+1


=

φ4 − φ3 − φ2φ
α−1
α
4 k
1−α
α
t+1
φ1φ
α−1
α
4 k
1
α
t+1


−1
=

φ4 − φ3
φ1φ
α−1
α
4
k
−
1
α
t+1 −
φ2
φ1
k−1t+1


−1
, (4.7)
which is what is plotted in Figure 4.2.
ks is globally stable: wherever k starts (other than 0), it converges to ks.
Suppose that k is initially at a magnitude such as k′0, greater than ks (i.e., to the
right of ks). Because kt+1 is less than kt when kt exceeds ks, k
′
1 is less than k
′
0.
By a similar line of reasoning to that employed in the context of the relationship
between pt+1 and pt, k
′
1 should lie between ks and k
′
0. Thus, at every step k
moves part way towards ks. This process gets repeated in each period resulting
in k converging smoothly to ks. A similar analysis applies when the initial per
capita capital magnitude is less than ks such as k0.
In order to analyze the global dynamics of our system, the phase diagram in
Figure 4.3 is developed.
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Figure 4.2: The Dynamics of Per Capita Capital
The phase diagram in Figure 4.3 locates (kt, pt) pairs at which per capita
capital or the price ratio stop changing over time.
Per capita capital at period t+1 is equal to savings at period t which is given
by (3.66). Thus subtracting kt from both sides of (3.66) yields
kt+1 − kt = φ4p
α
α−β
t − kt.
When kt+1 − kt = 0, kt = φ4p
α
α−β
t . Thus, this equation captures the relationship
between pt and kt when kt+1 − kt = 0, and is plotted as the ∆kt = 0 curve
in Figure 4.3. This curve shows possible steady state magnitudes of per capita
capital for a given price ratio. Points lying to the right of (below) the curve show
that kt is greater than the steady state magnitude implied by the given price
ratio. As Figure 4.2 shows when kt is greater than ks, kt+1 < kt or ∆kt < 0,
implying that k would be declining over time. Similarly, for points lying to the
left of (above) this curve, kt+1 > kt or ∆kt > 0.
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Figure 4.3: Phase Diagram for Per Capita Capital and the Price Ratio
The locus of (kt, pt) pairs at which the price ratio is at its steady state, is given
by ps from (3.76). This is the constant ∆pt = 0 plot in Figure 4.3. Points lying
below this horizontal line correspond to price ratios smaller than ps for which
pt+1 > pt or ∆pt > 0 by Figure 4.1. Likewise, points above this line indicate that
pt+1 < pt by the same figure.
Region I of the phase diagram contains points below both the ∆kt = 0 and
the ∆pt = 0 loci. Hence, ∆kt < 0 and ∆pt > 0, implying that this is the region
where kt is falling and pt is rising. Points in Region II are above the ∆kt = 0
locus but below the ∆pt = 0 locus. Hence, ∆kt > 0 and ∆pt > 0 or, both kt
and pt are rising. Points in Region III are above both the ∆kt = 0 locus and the
∆pt = 0 locus. With ∆kt > 0 and ∆pt < 0, kt is rising and pt is falling. Finally,
region IV includes points below ∆kt = 0 and above the ∆pt = 0 locus. Hence,
∆kt < 0 and ∆pt < 0. Thus, both kt and pt are falling. Therefore, whatever
magnitudes per capita capital and the price ratio initially take, the same steady
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state (ks, ps) is reached.
The numerical values behind Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 (reported in Table 4.1)
initially places the economy in region II of the phase diagram in Figure 4.3. These
values are chosen to make sure that the initial price ratio and the initial per
capita capital magnitude would put the economy on its transition path towards
the steady state. Under these circumstances, per capita capital and the price
ratio would steadily increase until the steady state is reached. Yet, the same
would not necessarily be valid for all initial price ratios and initial per capita
capital magnitudes. In general, the ability of the economy to converge towards
the long-run equilibrium would depend on these initial values.
To investigate the effects of initial values on convergence, different initial per
capita capital magnitudes (k) and different initial price ratios (p) were considered
and the associated number of iterations required for the numerical steady state
solution to be reached were computed. The results are reported below.
Table 4.2: Initial Price Ratios and Per Capita Capital
k0 p0 i
∗
I0 0.0200 0.3000 11 Region I
I1 0.0050 0.1000 13
I2 0.0030 0.2500 11
I3 0.0010 0.2700 11 Region II
I4 0.0035 0.3500 10
I5 0.0085 0.4187 1 ∆pt = 0 locus
I6 0.0120 0.4500 8 Region III
I7 0.0200 0.4187 8 Region IV
I8 0.0200 0.4500 10
I9 0.0200 0.4900 1 ∆pt = 0 locus
∗ i is the number of moves from the initial values to the steady state.
For different initial price ratios and per capita capital magnitudes considered,
the transition paths of the economy are plotted in Figure 4.4 through Figure 4.7.
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ferent Initial Values in Region I
It is clearly observed that these transition paths have a common part which
leads the economy towards the steady state. For any initial (k0, p0) pair, the
economy converges to the steady state, if the transition curve is reachable from
those initial values while respecting the dynamics.
According to Figure 4.3, the economy can initially be in one of four different
regions. If the economy starts from a point in region I, such as point I0 or I1 in
Figure 4.4, then a one period move occurs in the price ratio causing per capita
capital to cross the ∆kt = 0 locus, and the economy settles in region I after
which the economy moves gradually to the steady state with the price ratio as
well as per capita capital increasing. Hence, for any initial values in region I, the
economy converges to its steady state solution.
If the economy starts from a point in region II, such as point I2 or I3 in
Figure 4.5, then the economy moves gradually towards the steady state solution.
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Figure 4.5: Phase Diagram for Per Capita Capital and the Price Ratio for Dif-
ferent Initial Values in Region II
However, for other points of region II that lie above the transition curve, the
steady state solution is not always reachable and the economy stays stuck in
its initial conditions. More precisely, starting with such points as point I4 from
which the economy can be put on the transition curve by an increase in both the
price ratio and per capita capital magnitude, the steady state solution will be
reachable. Otherwise, steady state solution will be impossible to reach. Hence,
for all initial values in region II that lie below the transition curve, the economy
converges to its steady state solution. However, for only some other points that
lie above the transition curve, the economy converges to its steady state solution.
If the economy starts from a point in region III, then it may not always con-
verge to its steady state solution, staying stuck in its initial conditions instead. In
fact, in this region per capita capital is increasing while the price ratio is decreas-
ing. So, an increase in per capita capital is needed in order to put the economy on
the transition curve. However, this is not allowed because of the autarkic nature
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Figure 4.6: Phase Diagram for Per Capita Capital and the Price Ratio for Dif-
ferent Initial Values in Region III
of the economy which rules out the possibility of capital inflows from the outside
world. In other words, since the only source of capital is the savings of the young,
capital initially available to the economy may not be sufficient to put it on the
transition curve. The only points of region III from which the economy can con-
verge to its steady state are those that are close enough to (ks, ps), such as I6 in
Figure 4.6. So, initially per capita capital increases and price ratio decreases and
puts the economy in region IV. Then, the economy is governed by the dynamics
of region IV where per capita capital decreases and the price ratio deceases, until
the steady state is reached. For some other points of region III that lie just a
little bit above the steady state price ratio the economy converges, if the available
capital is sufficient to allow for the existence of a general equilibrium solution.
If the economy starts from some point lying to the left of (ks, ps) and on the
∆pt = 0 locus, such as point I5 in Figure 4.6, then it is not always the case that
the economy converges. From points to the right of I5, the economy converges in
54
a one period move to the steady state. From points to the left of I5, on the other
hand, the economy can not converge since the available capital is not sufficient
and there are no additional means of accumulating extra capital. Hence, the
economy gets stuck in its initial conditions where a general equilibrium solution
does not exist.
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Figure 4.7: Phase Diagram for Per Capita Capital and the Price Ratio for Dif-
ferent Initial Values in Region IV
If the economy starts from a point in region IV, such as point I8 or I9 in
Figure 4.7, then the economy moves gradually towards the steady state solution
by a decrease in both the price ratio and per capita capital. In fact, for all points
of region IV, the economy converges to the steady state solution. In fact, in
this region more capital is available than enough to have producers maximizing
profits, consumers maximizing utility and markets cleared.
If the economy starts from some point lying to the right of (ks, ps) and on the
∆pt = 0 locus, such as point I7 in Figure 4.7, then it is always the case that the
economy converges to the steady state, since there is already enough capital.
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Returning to the numerical values we considered in Table4.1, the time paths of
per capita capital and the price ratio are given in Figure 4.8. As it is clearly seen,
per capita capital starts increasing until stabilizing at its steady state magnitude.
A similar observation holds for the price ratio.
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Figure 4.8: Time Paths for Per Capita Capital and the Price Ratio
Table 4.3: Steady State of k and p
k0 p0 ks ps
0.0010 0.2000 0.0120 0.4187
The long-run equilibrium magnitude of per capita capital and the price ratio
for this numerical example are given in Table 4.3.
The time paths of the rental and wage rates are given in Figure 4.9. Since per
capita capital is increasing, it is expected that the rental rate will be decreasing
and the wage rate will be increasing. This is exactly what is observed from
Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: Time Paths for the Rental Rate and the Wage Rate
The long-run equilibrium factor prices are given in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Equilibrium Factor Prices
rs ws
3.5877 0.0697
Hence, the rental rate is clearly seen to be decreasing over time until converg-
ing to its steady state value, whereas the wage rate follows an increasing path
over time until stabilizing at its steady state value.
The time paths of the first period consumption are given in Figure 4.10. The
consumption of both goods are increasing over time until the steady state is
reached. Thus, during the transition to the steady state, each new generation
enjoys more of both goods to consume during the first period of their lives. The
time paths of second period consumption of both goods are given in Figure 4.10.
Similarly to the case with first period consumption, it can be noted that each new
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generation enjoys a higher consumption of each good during their second period
of life, until the steady state is reached. Whether future generations are at least
as well off as the current generations depends on the position of the economy
while moving to the steady state.
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Figure 4.10: Time Paths for Per Capita Consumptions
If the steady state is still far to be reached, then the new generation is strictly
better off than the previous generation in terms of the amount of the commodities
consumed. If the steady state is already reached, then the future generation will
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enjoy the same level of consumption as the previous one. This fact is obviously
captured by the individual’s life time utility too.
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Figure 4.11: Time Path for the Individual’s Utility
As it can be seen from Figure 4.11, the time path of the individual’s util-
ity is steadily rising over time until the steady state is reached after which all
generations face the same welfare level.
Table 4.5: Equilibrium Real Per Capita Consumptions
c1ys c2ys c1os c2os us
0.0223 0.0799 0.0256 0.0916 0.0493
The long-run equilibrium of real per capita consumptions of each good and
utility are given in Table 4.5.
In the long-run, per capita magnitudes of all variables would be constant
but, the levels of the variables would grow at a constant rate that is equal to
population growth rate, n. On the balanced growth path, capital stock as well
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as total output grow at this natural growth rate of population. Similarly, on the
steady state, the total consumption of both goods grow at the population growth
rate. The growth rate of total capital stock, total output, and total consumption
of each good are plotted in Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: Total Capital Stock and Output Growth Rates
It is clearly displayed that all these variables initially grow at a high rate
as the economy starts moving from its initial conditions. However, the rate at
which the levels of the variables grow, decreases as the economy moves along its
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transition path until it settles at the natural rate of growth which is equal to the
population growth rate.
4.1 The Effect of an Increase in the Population
Growth Rate on Long-Run Equilibrium
The effect of population growth rate on ∆kt = 0 and ∆pt = 0 loci is plotted in
Figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.13: The Effects of an Increase in the Population Growth Rate
To create the plots in this figure, we consider first an economy with zero
population growth rate that is on its long-run equilibrium, i.e., at point E − 0.
Then, we suppose that that there is a permanent increase in the population
growth rate to n = 0.16.
Initially, the economy is at point E0 in Figure 4.13. As a result of the increase
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in the population growth rate both ∆kt = 0 and ∆pt = 0 loci are affected.
∆kt = 0 locus moves up and the ∆pt = 0 locus moves down resulting in a
lower long-run equilibrium given by point E1. The path followed by the economy
moving from E0 to E1 is also plotted in Figure 4.13. The price ratio as well as
per capita capital decrease gradually until reaching lower long-run equilibrium
values. This establishes that a permanent increase in the population growth rate
leads in the long-run to lower equilibrium magnitude of per capita capital and
the price ratio.
4.2 The Effect of an Increase in the Saving Rate
The effect of a permanent increase in the saving rate is given in Figure 4.14.
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Figure 4.14: The Effects of an Increase in the Saving Rate
First, we consider our positive population growth rate (n = 0.16) economy on
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its balanced growth path, and suppose that there is a permanent increase in the
saving rate. That is, a decrease in the parameter µ. Initially, µ0 = 0.8 (saving
rate = 0.2), and suppose that µ1 becomes equal to 0.7 (saving rate = 0.3).
Initially, the economy is on point E0 in Figure 4.14. As a result of an increase
in the saving rate, both ∆kt = 0 and ∆pt = 0 loci are affected.
∆kt = 0 locus pivots down and ∆pt = 0 locus shifts up, resulting in a higher
intersection point given by E1. While our economy’s initial endowments and
initial price ratio are given by point E0, at the time of the increase in the saving
rate its dynamics are now governed by the new ∆kt = 0 and ∆pt = 0 loci. Under
these circumstances, k and p rise gradually to their new balanced growth path
values given by E1 at higher than their values on the original balanced growth
path given by E0, implying that a permanent increase in the saving rate leads in
the long-run to higher equilibrium magnitude of per capita capital and the price
ratio.
63
CHAPTER V
POPULATION GROWTH
RATE DIFFERENCES
This chapter looks into the role that the differences in the population growth
rates across nations could play as a determinant of long-run comparative advan-
tages, and discusses the validity of welfare predictions of the static HO model in
the long-run.
The effect of population growth rate, n, on steady state magnitudes of key
variables is identified, by examining long-run closed form solutions of the autarkic
economy. Simulation exercises are also performed to have an idea about the time
paths of the model variables for specific model parameter values.
Remembering that the equilibrium steady state price ratio ps is given by
ps = Φ
α−β
1−α , (5.1)
where
Φ =
φ4 − φ3
φ1 + φ2
,
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the long-run closed form solutions for the steady state per capita magnitudes are
obtained as
ks = φ4Φ
α
1−α , (5.2)
ws = (1− α)ǫ
αΦ
α
1−α , (5.3)
rs = αǫ
α−1 1
Φ
. (5.4)
x1s =
δl¯
δ − ǫ
ǫαΦ
β
1−α +
1
δ − ǫ
δβφ4Φ
2α−1
1−α (5.5)
x2s = −
ǫl¯
δ − ǫ
δβΦ
β
1−α +
1
δ − ǫ
δβφ4Φ
α+β−1
1−α (5.6)
c1ys = µθ(1− α)l¯ǫ
αΦ
α
1−α , (5.7)
c2ys = µ(1− θ)(1− α)l¯ǫ
αΦ
β
1−α , (5.8)
c1os = 1− µ)θ(1− α)l¯ǫ
α(1 + αǫα−1
1
Φ
)Φ
α
1−α , (5.9)
c2os = (1− µ)(1− θ)(1− α)l¯ǫ
α(1 + αǫα−1
1
Φ
)Φ
β
1−α . (5.10)
5.1 The Effect of the Population Growth Rate
on the Long-run Model Variables
Corollary 1 The equilibrium price ratio, ps, is decreasing in the population
growth rate n, if the relatively capital-intensive sector is sector 1, and is increasing
in the population growth rate, if it is sector 2.
The effect of the population growth rate n on the steady state price ratio is
given by
∂ps
∂n
=
(
α− β
1− α
)
Φ
α−β
1−α
−1∂Φ
∂n
. (5.11)
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In order to evaluate the sign of the above expression, we need to find out the
sign of ∂Φ
∂n
.
First of all,
φ4 − φ3 =
1
1 + n
(1− µ)(1− β)l¯
(
δβ − (1− θ)β(δ − ǫ)δβ−1
)
,
φ1 + φ2 = (1− θ)(1− β)l¯(δ − ǫ)
(
µ+
1− µ
1 + n
)
+ ǫl¯.
So,
Φ =
φ4 − φ3
φ1 + φ2
=
(1− µ)(1− β)l¯(δβ − (1− θ)β(δ − ǫ)δβ−1)
(1 + n)((1− θ)(1− β)l¯(δ − ǫ)(µ+ 1−µ
1+n
) + ǫl¯)
=
(1− µ)(1− β)δβ[1− (1− θ)β(1− ǫ
δ
)]
(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)(1 + nµ) + (1 + n)ǫ
.
Taking the derivative of the above with respect to n results in
∂Φ
∂n
=
−(1− µ)(1− β)δβ[1− (1− θ)β(1− ǫ
δ
)][(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)µ+ ǫ]
[(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)(1 + nµ) + (1 + n)ǫ]2
=
−(1− µ)(1− β) δ
β
ǫ
[1− (1− θ)β(1− ǫ
δ
)][(1− θ)(1− β)( δ
ǫ
− 1)µ+ 1]
[(1− θ)(1− β)( δ
ǫ
− 1)(1 + nµ) + (1 + n)]2
.
Since the denominator of the above expression is positive, we need to find out
the sign of the numerator. Now, given the first expression between the squared
brackets in the numerator
1− (1− θ)β(1−
ǫ
δ
) = 1−
(1− θ)(β − α)
(1− α)
.
We have
β − α
1− α
< 1,
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and
0 < 1− θ < 1.
So, multiplying the previous inequality by the above results in
(1− θ)(β − α)
(1− α)
< (1− θ) < 1.
Thus,
0 < 1−
(1− θ)(β − α)
1− α
.
Similarly, the second expression between the squared brackets in the numerator
is
(1− θ)(1− β)(
δ
ǫ
− 1)µ+ 1 = (1− θ)(β − α)
µ
α
+ 1. (5.12)
Since
0 < β < 1,
and
0 < α < 1,
we have
−α < β − α < 1− α.
We also have
0 < (1− θ)
µ
α
.
So, multiplying the sides of the previous inequality by the above results in
−α(1− θ)
µ
α
< (β − α)(1− θ)
µ
α
.
Thus,
−(1− θ)µ < (1− θ)(β − α)
µ
α
.
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But since
(1− θ)µ < 1,
we obtain
0 < (1− θ)(β − α)
µ
α
+ 1,
establishing that
∂Φ
∂n
< 0.
Now, the sign of ∂ps
∂n
depends on the sign of −
(
α−β
1−α
)
.
Therefore,
∂ps
∂n


< 0 for α > β
> 0 for α < β.
(5.13)
Thus, the equilibrium price of a good decreases with n, if the production of
that good is relatively labor-intensive, and increases, if the production of that
good is relatively capital-intensive. This implies that countries with a rapidly
growing population will have a relative cost advantage in the production of labor-
intensive commodities, whereas countries with a slowly growing population will
have a relative cost advantage in the production of capital-intensive commodities.
In other words, if we start with two countries/regions that are identical in every
respect except the population growth rates, the high(low) population growth rate-
country will become labor-(capital-)abundant over time, and have a comparative
advantage/specialise in the production of labor-(capital) intensive commodity,
just as predicted by the HO model.
Corollary 2 The steady state magnitudes of per capita capital, ks, and the wage
rate, ws, are decreasing in the population growth rate n, whereas that of the rental
rate, rs, is increasing in the population growth rate n.
The effect of the population growth rate n on the steady state per capita
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capital is
∂ks
∂n
= Φ
α
1−α
∂φ4
∂n
+ φ4
(
α
1− α
)
Φ
α
1−α
−1∂Φ
∂n
. (5.14)
Since
φ4 > 0,
∂φ4
∂n
= −
φ4
1 + n
< 0,
and since
Φ > 0,
∂Φ
∂n
< 0.
Then,
∂ks
∂n
< 0
So, the prediction of the neoclassical economic growth models by Solow
(1956), Swan (1956) and in particular the one-sector OLG model by Diamond
(1965) concerning the population growth rate is also captured by our two-sector
model.
The effect of the population growth rate n on the steady state wage rate is
∂ws
∂n
= (1− α)ǫα
(
α
1− α
)
Φ
α
1−α
−1∂Φ
∂n
(5.15)
Then,
∂ws
∂n
< 0.
Thus, low-population growth countries tend to have a higher wage rate than
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high-population growth countries, explaining why they would have a comparative
disadvantage in the production of labor-intensive commodities. This also implies
that unequal population growth rates could induce labor-migration from high- to
low-population growth nations in the absence of barriers to labor mobility.
The effect of the population growth rate n on the steady state rental rate is
∂rs
∂n
= αǫα−1
∂
∂n
(
1
Φ
)
. (5.16)
In order to find out the sign of the above expression, we need to look at the
sign of ∂
∂n
(
1
Φ
)
.
We have
1
Φ
=
(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)(1 + nµ) + (1 + n)ǫ
(1− µ)(1− β)δβ[1− (1− θ)β(1− ǫ
δ
)]
(5.17)
So,
∂
∂n
(
1
Φ
)
=
[(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)µ+ ǫ](1− µ)(1− β)δβ[1− (1− θ)β(1− ǫ
δ
)]
[(1− µ)(1− β)δβ(1− (1− θ)β(1− ǫ
δ
))]2
=
ǫ[(1− θ)(1− β)( δ
ǫ
− 1)µ+ 1]
(1− µ)(1− β)δβ[1− (1− θ)β(1− ǫ
δ
)]
It was previously shown that
(1− θ)(1− β)(
δ
ǫ
− 1)µ+ 1 = (1− θ)(β − α)
1
α
µ+ 1 > 0
and
1− (1− θ)β(1−
ǫ
δ
) = 1−
(1− θ)(β − α)
1− α
> 0.
In fact,
∂
∂n
(
1
Φ
)
= −
1
Φ2
∂Φ
∂n
.
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Hence,
∂
∂n
(
1
Φ
)
> 0.
Thus,
∂rs
∂n
> 0.
Hence, countries with a slowly growing population tend to have a lower rental rate
on capital than countries with a rapidly growing population. This is what gives
these countries a comparative advantage in the production of capital-intensive
commodities, and, in the absence of restrictions to capital mobility, would en-
courage flows of capital from capital-abundant countries to labor-abundant coun-
tries. Furthermore, capital flows induced by population aging in one region of
the world can transmit the growth and reduce allocation effects of aging globally,
as suggested before by Tosun (2003) and Kenc¸ and Sayan (2001).
Corollary 3 The equilibrium per capita consumptions by youngs of good 1, c1ys,
and good 2, c2ys, are decreasing in the population growth rate n, whereas the
equilibrium per capita consumptions by the elderly of both goods are ambiguous in
the population growth rate, n.
The first period equilibrium consumptions of both goods decrease in the pop-
ulation growth rate. This inverse relationship between n and equilibrium magni-
tudes of young generation’s consumption follows from the negative relationship
between the wage rate and n in the case of good 1, and from the fact that the
population growth rate elasticity of the price ratio is higher than the population
growth rate elasticity of the wage rate in the case of good 2.
We have
∂c1ys
∂n
= µθl¯
∂ws
∂n
.
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Since
∂ws
∂n
< 0,
∂c1ys
∂n
< 0.
As for the first period equilibrium per capita consumption of good 2, we have
c2ys = µ(1− θ)l¯
ws
ps
.
Plugging in the expressions for ws and ps in the above gives (5.8), then taking
the derivative with respect to the population growth rate n results in
∂c2ys
∂n
= µ(1− θ)(1− α)l¯ǫα
(
β
1− α
)
Φ
β
1−α
−1∂Φ
∂n
, (5.18)
Since
∂Φ
∂n
< 0,
∂c2ys
∂n
< 0.
Then,
∂c2ys
∂n
= µ(1− θ)l¯
1
p2s
(
ps
∂ws
∂n
− ws
∂ps
∂n
)
< 0,
implying that
n
ws
∂ws
∂n
<
n
ps
∂ps
∂n
.
Thus, the population growth rate elasticity of the wage rate is less than the
population growth rate elasticity of the price ratio.
The second period equilibrium per capita consumption of good 1 is decreasing
in n if 1
rs
> 1−2α
α
and is increasing in n if 1
rs
< 1−2α
α
, where rs is the steady state
rental rate.
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We have
c1os = (1− µ)θl¯ws(1 + rs).
Substituting the long-run closed form solutions of ws and rs in the above expres-
sion results in
c1os = (1 + n)θφ4Φ
α
1−α
(
1 + αǫα−1
1
Φ
)
.
Taking the derivative of the above expression with respect to the population
growth rate leads to
∂c1os
∂n
= θφ4Φ
α
1−α
+ (1 + n)θΦ
α
1−α
∂φ4
∂n
+ (1 + n)θφ4
(
α
1− α
)
Φ
α
1−α
−1∂Φ
∂n
+ θφ4Φ
α
1−α
−1αǫα−1
+ (1 + n)θΦ
α
1−α
−1αǫα−1
∂φ4
∂n
+ (1 + n)θφ4αǫ
α−1
(
α
1− α
− 1
)
Φ
α
1−α
−2∂Φ
∂n
Plugging in
∂φ4
∂n
= −
φ4
1 + n
in the above expression results in
∂c1os
∂n
= (1 + n)θφ4
(
α
1− α
)
Φ
α
1−α
−1∂Φ
∂n
+ (1 + n)θφ4αǫ
α−1
(
α
1− α
− 1
)
Φ
α
1−α
−2∂Φ
∂n
.
So, rewriting the above expression we obtain
∂c1os
∂n
= (1 + n)θφ4
(
1
1− α
)
Φ
α
1−α
−1∂Φ
∂n
(α+ (2α− 1)rs),
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where
rs = αǫ
α−1
(
1
Φ
)
.
Since
∂Φ
∂n
< 0,
∂c1os
∂n


< 0 if α + (2α− 1)rs > 0
> 0 if α + (2α− 1)rs < 0.
(5.19)
Alternatively,
∂c1os
∂n


< 0 if 1
rs
> 1−2α
α
> 0 if 1
rs
< 1−2α
α
.
(5.20)
The effect of the population growth rate n on c1os can also be written in terms of
the system’s parameters as follows:
∂c1os
∂n


< 0 if Φ > (1− 2α)ǫα−1
> 0 if Φ < (1− 2α)ǫα−1.
(5.21)
Similarly the second period per capita consumption of good 2 is decreasing in
n if 1
rs
> 1−(α+β)
β
and is increasing in n if 1
rs
< 1−(α+β)
β
.
We have
c2os = (1− µ)(1− θ)l¯
ws
ps
(1 + rs).
Substituting the long-run closed form solutions of ws, ps and rs in the above
expression results in
c2os = (1 + n)(1− θ)φ4Φ
β
1−α
(
1 + ǫα−1
1
Φ
)
.
Taking the derivative of the above expression with respect to the population
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growth rate leads to
∂c2os
∂n
= (1− θ)φ4Φ
β
1−α
+ (1 + n)(1− θ)Φ
β
1−α
∂φ4
∂n
+ (1 + n)(1− θ)φ4
(
β
1− α
)
Φ
β
1−α
−1∂Φ
∂n
+ (1− θ)φ4Φ
β
1−α
−1αǫα−1
+ (1 + n)(1− θ)Φ
β
1−α
−1αǫα−1
∂φ4
∂n
+ (1 + n)(1− θ)φ4αǫ
α−1
(
β
1− α
− 1
)
Φ
β
1−α
−2∂Φ
∂n
.
Plugging in
∂φ4
∂n
= −
φ4
1 + n
in the above expression results in
∂c2os
∂n
= (1 + n)(1− θ)φ4
(
β
1− α
)
Φ
β
1−α
−1∂Φ
∂n
+ (1 + n)(1− θ)φ4αǫ
α−1
(
β
1− α
− 1
)
Φ
β
1−α
−2∂Φ
∂n
.
So, rewriting the above expression we obtain
∂c2os
∂n
= (1 + n)(1− θ)φ4
(
1
1− α
)
Φ
β
1−α
−1∂Φ
∂n
(β + (β + α− 1)rs),
where
rs = αǫ
α−1
(
1
Φ
)
.
Since
∂Φ
∂n
< 0,
∂c2os
∂n


< 0 if β + (β + α− 1)rs > 0
> 0 if β + (β + α− 1)rs < 0.
(5.22)
75
Equivalently,
∂c2os
∂n


< 0 if 1
rs
> 1−(α+β)
β
> 0 if 1
rs
< 1−(α+β)
β
.
(5.23)
The effect of the population growth rate n on c2os can also be written in terms of
the system’s parameters as follows,
∂c2os
∂n


< 0 if Φ > α
β
(1− α− β)ǫα−1
> 0 if Φ < α
β
(1− α− β)ǫα−1.
(5.24)
This implies that the trade effects on the welfare of the two countries would
not be as straightforward to predict as in the case of the static HO model. The
welfare results under autarky are driven by the relationship between the values of
production parameters and the rental rate rs which itself varies with n as shown
by (5.1). Given that trade will lead to the establishment of a common rental
rate between the autarky rentals of trading nations distinguished solely by their
population growth rates, the welfare level of each nation may change in either
direction, depending on how different consumption variables are affected by the
trade-induced change in rentals on capital. Results indicating that trade would
not necessarily lead to welfare gains for both countries and might not even be
Pareto-superior to autarky have been presented in previous studies based on OLG
models with stationary populations (see, for example, Fried (1980), Mountford
(1998)).
5.2 Summary
Our discussion of the closed-form solutions to the 2x2 OLG model in this chapter
has shown that of the two countries/regions that are identical in every respect
except the population growth rates, the high(low) population growth rate-country
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will become labor-(capital-) abundant over time, and must be expected to have a
comparative advantage in the production of labor-(capital-) intensive commodity,
as suggested by the static HO model. The welfare effects of trade between two
countries, however, were found to depend on the values of system parameters,
and hence, were ambiguous, adding unequal population growth rates to the list
of previously suggested reasons explaining why trade may not improve welfare
for both parties in a dynamic, OLG set-up.
5.3 A Numerical Example
The simulation exercise performed in this section does not only complement the
analytical findings in the previous section, but also helps to visualize the time
paths of the model variables under study. The model parameters are chosen as
follows:
Table 5.1: Model Parameter Values
α β µ θ l¯
0.50 0.30 0.80 0.40 1
Two values for the population growth rate n are chosen and each is compared
to the case of zero population growth rate (n = 0): n = 0.16 (roughly the
equivalent of a 0.05% annual population growth rate, the unweighted average of
the population growth rate for the high income countries between 1980 − 2002
and the projected values from 2002 − 2015, WDI (2004)), and n = 0.7 (the
equivalent of a 1.8% annual population growth rate, the unweighted average of
the population growth rate for the low income countries between 1980−2002 and
the projected values from 2002− 2015, WDI (2004))
The time paths of per capita capital and the price ratio for the different values
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Figure 5.1: Time Paths for Per Capita Capital and the Price Ratio
of the population growth rates are given in Figure 5.1. As it was shown analyti-
cally, the long-run equilibrium per capita capital magnitude is decreasing in the
population growth rate. The long-run equilibrium price ratio is also decreasing in
the population growth rate, since the relatively capital intensive sector is sector
1, or equivalently α > β.
It must also be noted that the path for per capita capital in the higher popu-
lation growth rate-country lies below that for the lower population growth rate-
country along the transition as well as the long-run equilibrium. This also holds
for the path of the price ratio.
The equilibrium magnitudes of per capita capital and the price ratio for this
numerical example are given in Table 5.2.
The time paths of the rental rate and the wage rate are given in Figure 5.2.
The time path of the rental rate for the higher population growth rate lies above
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Table 5.2: Equilibrium of k and p for Given Values of n
n 0 0.16 0.70
ks 0.0163 0.0120 0.0055
ps 0.4459 0.4187 0.3568
that for the lower population growth rate. The time path of the wage rate as-
sociated with the higher population growth rate lies below that associated with
the lower population growth rate. It is clearly seen that the long-run equilib-
rium rental rate is increasing in the population growth rate, whereas the long-run
equilibrium wage rate is decreasing in the population growth rate.
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Figure 5.2: Time Paths for the Rental Rate and the Wage Rate
The production sector’s long-run equilibrium factor prices are given in Ta-
ble 5.3.
The time paths of per capita production of both goods are given in Figure 5.3.
It is clearly seen that the higher the population growth rate is, the lower the per
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Table 5.3: Equilibrium Factor Prices for some Values of n
n 0 0.16 0.70
rs 3.0656 3.5880 5.3541
ws 0.0816 0.0697 0.0467
capita production of both goods. In the long-run, per capita production settles
on a lower magnitude for the higher population growth rate-country.
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Figure 5.3: Time Paths for Per Capita Production
The time paths of per capita consumption of both goods is given in Figure 5.4.
As it was shown analytically, the higher the population growth rate is, the lower
the long-run equilibrium magnitude of per capita consumption of both goods by
young will be. It is also clear that the path of per capita consumption by young
of both goods under the higher population growth rate lies below that under
the lower population growth rate. Hence, every new larger generation is worse
off when young as it has less to consume from both goods than the previous
generation. In particular, if the population growth rate is positive than the new
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young generation is worse off, otherwise it is better off.
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Figure 5.4: Time Paths for Per Capita Consumptions
However, the effect of the population growth rate on per capita consumption
by old of both goods does not obey a uniform pattern. In fact, it can be noticed
that per capita consumption of good 1 by old corresponding to the high popu-
lation growth rate is temporarily and slightly higher than that corresponding to
the lower population growth rate at the early stages of transition. Later, as the
economy moves towards the steady state, it becomes lower and settles on a lower
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long-run equilibrium.
The consumption side’s long-run equilibrium consumption and utility are
given in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Equlibrium Values of Per Capita Consumptions for some Values of n
n 0 0.16 0.70
c1ys 0.0261 0.0223 0.0149
c2ys 0.0878 0.0799 0.0628
c1os 0.0265 0.0256 0.0237
c2os 0.0892 0.0916 0.0996
us 0.0542 0.0493 0.0387
The per capita consumption of good 2 by old though obeys a uniform pattern
but with a population growth rate effect opposite in direction to that of per capita
consumption by young.
In fact, the time path of per capita consumption of good 2 by old for the
high population growth rate lies below that for the low population growth rate.
Hence, the higher the population growth rate, the lower the magnitude of the
long-run per capita consumption of good 2 by old. So, the overall effect of the
population growth rate on per capita consumption by old is ambiguous.
It can be noticed for the case of a positive population growth rate that not
only does each new generation enjoys at worse, the same consumption of good 2
during their second period of life compared to the previous generation but also
the larger the new generation is, the more per capita consumption of good 2 is
enjoyed when old.
So, the higher the population growth rate is, the lower the long-run per capita
consumption of both goods when young, the lower the long-run per capita con-
sumption of good 1 when old, but the higher the long-run per capita consumption
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of good 2 when old. In other words, for high population growth rates the new
generation is worse off when young and may be better off when old.
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Figure 5.5: Time Paths for the Individual’s Utility
The overall effect on welfare is given by the individual’s utility as it can be
seen from Figure 5.5. It turned out for this case that the higher the population
growth rate is the lower the individual’s long-run equilibrium utility. Hence, the
higher the population growth rate is, the worse off the individual gets.
The behavior of the economy once it has converged to the balanced growth
path (ks, ps) is characterized by the stationarity of all per capita variables. In
other words, capital, output, and consumption in per capita terms become con-
stant, whereas total capital stock, total output, and total consumption grow at
the natural rate of growth which is the population growth rate, n.
On the balanced growth path, capital stock as well as total output grow at the
natural rate of growth, the population growth rate. This is given by Figure 5.6.
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Similarly, on the steady state, the total consumption of good 1 as well as that
of good 2 grow at the population growth rate.
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Figure 5.6: Growth Rates of Total Consumption
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CHAPTER VI
TRADE BETWEEN EQUAL
SIZED COUNTRIES
By the static 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model of international trade, dif-
ferences in relative factor endowments across countries suffice to render trade
Pareto-superior to autarky, as long as the factor intensity of production is dif-
ferent for each commodity. While this model has proved to be a very popular
starting point for many theoretical and empirical studies, only a few studies in
the literature have investigated the validity of predictions of the standard HO
model in a dynamic framework. This lack of interest was possibly due to the fact
that trade itself would, in the long-run, eliminate the initial differences between
relative factor endowments of countries that are assumed to be identical in ev-
ery other respect, thereby leaving no further incentives for partners to continue
trading (Chen (1992)).
This chapter argues that trade may continue to occur in the long-run if there
are additional differences to make factor proportions evolve over time, and shows
that differential speed of population growth across nations is one of the attributes
that could lead to such an evolution in relative factor endowments, allowing for
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the continuation of trade in the long-run by the criteria set forth in the Heckscher-
Ohlin framework. Yet, results in the study also indicate that in the absence of
additional differences such as variations in the speed of technological progress or
human capital formation, differences in relative endowments of factors will not
be sufficient to render trade mutually beneficial in the long-run.
Although changes in relative factor endowments arising due to the differential
speed of demographic transition in developing and developed parts of the world
are gradually becoming a major factor to affect future patterns of trade, the
dynamic trade literature has largely overlooked this issue so far (Sayan (2002)).
This chapter aims to contribute to the literature by extending the static HO
model into a dynamic, overlapping generations set-up to look into the role that
the differences in the population growth rates across nations could play as a
determinant of long-run comparative advantages and to discuss the validity of
welfare predictions of the static HO model in the long-run.3
For this purpose, we consider a world that is made up of two countries/regions
each producing two commodities by using capital and labor. We assume that
countries are identical in every other respect than the rates of population growth,
and study the implications of this for trade by using the closed-form solutions
for the autarky model in Chapter 3 and by solving the trade model analytically.
The economies we consider are populated by individuals that live for two periods,
and the population in each is allowed to grow constantly at a distinct and exoge-
nously given rate. Such an overlapping generations (OLG) structure capturing
the changing savings behavior of individuals over the working and retirement
phases of the life cycle implicitly allows the share of savings in national incomes
3The results in this chapter are generally consistent with and complement those in Galor
and Lin (1997) where the authors establish dynamic micro foundations of the HO model by
considering differences in time preference rates across two nations with stationary, rather than
growing, populations.
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to differ across countries, as differences in the speed of population growth induce
variations in relative shares of different age groups in populations. Thus, relative
factor endowments evolve, due not only to the changes in labor supply, but also
to the changes in capital accumulation resulting from the changing age profiles
of populations.
Investigation of the welfare implications of trade in the long-run within this
set-up is particularly interesting, as a number of studies based on OLG models
with stationary populations have previously suggested that trade would not nec-
essarily lead to mutual welfare gains, and might not even be Pareto-superior to au-
tarky in the long-run (e.g., Fried (1980), Galor (1988b) and Galor (1988a), Mount-
ford (1998); see also Sayan (2002) for a more detailed discussion).
6.1 Free Trade Scenario
Let L and H denote the low-population growth rate and the high-population
growth rate countries, respectively. Let the population growth rate of country
L be nL and that of country L be nH . Incorporating trade requires that the
world-wide supply for both goods is equal to the world-wide demand. Hence, the
market clearing condition for good 1 is now given by,
∑
i
X i1t =
∑
i
(Kit+1 −K
i
t) +
∑
i
(Ci1yt + C
i
1ot), for i = L,H. (6.1)
and the market clearing condition for good 2 is given by,
∑
i
X i2t =
∑
i
(Ci2yt + C
i
2ot), for i = L,H. (6.2)
where X ijt is total output of sector j (j = 1, 2) in country i (i = L,H); K
i
t is
capital stock in country i; Cijyt is total consumption of good j by the young in
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country i, and Cijot is total consumption of good j by the old in country i, all at
time t.
Walras’ law allows us to focus on the market clearance condition for the con-
sumption good (good 2) alone. Rewriting (6.2) in per capita terms results in
NLt x¯
L
2t +N
H
t x¯
H
2t = N
L
t c¯
L
2yt +N
L
t−1c¯
L
2ot +N
H
t c¯
H
2yt +N
H
t−1c¯
H
2ot, (6.3)
where the variables with overbars standing for the variables under trade. N it is
population size of the young at time t in country i, and N it−1 is population size of
the old at time t in country i. Given that free trade will lead to an equalization
of p¯it, the price of good 2 in terms of good 1, in both countries in each period,
p¯t = p¯
L
t = p¯
H
t , (6.4)
must hold true for every t. Consequently, factor price equalization theorem will
hold and result in
w¯Lt = w¯
H
t = w¯t (6.5)
r¯Lt = r¯
H
t = r¯t (6.6)
(6.5) and (6.6) follow because
w¯t = (1− β)δ
β p¯
α
α−β
t = (1− α)ǫ
αp¯
α
α−β
t , (6.7)
r¯t = βδ
β−1p¯
α−1
α−β
t = αǫ
α−1p¯
α−1
α−β
t , (6.8)
as previously shown in (3.45) and (3.46). Hence, optimal consumption amounts
will be equated across two countries. Focusing on good 2 only, we have
c¯L2yt = c¯
H
2yt = c¯2yt = µ(1− θ)l¯
w¯t
p¯t
(6.9)
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c¯L2ot = c¯
H
2ot = c¯2ot = (1− µ)(1− θ)(1 + r¯t)l¯
w¯t−1
p¯t
(6.10)
Substituting (6.9), (6.10) in the right hand side (RHS) of (6.3) we get
(NLt +N
H
t )c¯2yt + (N
L
t−1 +N
H
t−1)c¯2ot = (N
L
t +N
H
t )µ(1− θ)l¯
w¯t
p¯t
(6.11)
+ (NLt−1 +N
H
t−1)(1− µ)(1− θ)(1 + r¯t)l¯
w¯t−1
p¯t
Substituting (6.7) and (6.8) in (6.11) we observe that the RHS of (6.11) equals
(NLt +N
H
t )µ(1− θ)(1− β)l¯δ
β p¯
β
α−β
t (6.12)
+(NLt−1 +N
H
t−1)(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)l¯δ
β(1 + βδβ−1p¯
α−1
α−β
t )p¯
α
α−β
t−1 p¯
−
α
α−β
t
Remembering from (3.48) that,
x¯i2t = l¯
i
2tδ
β p¯
β
α−β
t for i = L,H, (6.13)
and substituting this into the left hand side (LHS) of (6.3) we get
NLt x¯
L
2t +N
H
t x¯
H
2t = (N
L
t l
L
2t +N
H
t l
H
2t)δ
β p¯
β
α−β
t (6.14)
Given (3.42) and (3.44) showing that
l¯i2t = −
ǫl¯
δ − ǫ
+
1
δ − ǫ
k¯itp¯
1
β−α
t , (6.15)
k¯i2t =
δ
δ − ǫ
k¯it −
δǫl¯
δ − ǫ
p¯
1
α−β
t , (6.16)
we can write the following by substituting (6.15) in the RHS of (6.14) by
1
δ − ǫ
(
(k¯Lt N
L
t + k¯
H
t N
H
t )p¯
1
β−α
t − ǫl¯(N
L
t +N
H
t )
)
δβ p¯
β
α−β
t (6.17)
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Now, equating (6.17) and (6.12), we get
1
δ − ǫ
(
(k¯Lt N
L
t + k¯
H
t N
H
t )p¯
1
β−α
t − ǫl¯(N
L
t +N
H
t )
)
δβ p¯
β
α−β
t (6.18)
= (NLt +N
H
t )µ(1− θ)(1− β)l¯δ
β p¯
β
α−β
t
+(NLt−1 +N
H
t−1)(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)l¯δ
β(1 + βδβ−1p¯
α−1
α−β
t )p¯
α
α−β
t−1 p¯
−
α
α−β
t
Rearranging terms,
NLt k¯
L
t +N
H
t k¯
H
t = (N
L
t +N
H
t )l¯(µ(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ) + ǫ)p¯
1
α−β
t (6.19)
+ (NLt−1 +N
H
t−1)(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)l¯p¯
α
α−β
t−1 p¯
1−α
α−β
t
+ (NLt−1 +N
H
t−1)(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)l¯βδ
β−1p¯
α
α−β
t−1
Let
φ1 = µ(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)l¯ + ǫl¯ (6.20)
φ¯2 = (1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)l¯ (6.21)
φ¯3 = (1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)l¯βδ
β−1 (6.22)
Hence,
NLt k¯
L
t +N
H
t k¯
H
t = (N
L
t +N
H
t )φ1p¯
1
α−β
t (6.23)
+ (NLt−1 +N
H
t−1)φ¯2p¯
α
α−β
t−1 p¯
1−α
α−β
t
+ (NLt−1 +N
H
t−1)φ¯3p¯
α
α−β
t−1
Per capita capital dynamics equation is given by
k¯it+1 =
1
1 + ni
(1− µ)l¯w¯t
=
1
1 + ni
(1− µ)(1− β)l¯δβ p¯
α
α−β
t
=
1
1 + ni
φ¯4p¯
α
α−β
t for i = L,H, (6.24)
where
φ¯4 = (1− µ)(1− β)l¯δ
β. (6.25)
Writing (6.23) at time t+ 1,
NLt+1k¯
L
t+1 +N
H
t+1k¯
H
t+1 = (N
L
t+1 +N
H
t+1)φ1p¯
1
α−β
t+1 (6.26)
+ (NLt +N
H
t )φ¯2p¯
α
α−β
t p¯
1−α
α−β
t+1
+ (NLt +N
H
t )Φ¯3p¯
α
α−β
t
and substituting (6.24) in (6.26), we get
(
1
1 + nL
NLt+1 +
1
1 + nH
NHt+1
)
φ¯4p¯
α
α−β
t = (N
L
t+1 +N
H
t+1)φ1p¯
1
α−β
t+1 (6.27)
+ (NLt +N
H
t )φ¯2p¯
α
α−β
t p¯
1−α
α−β
t+1
+ (NLt +N
H
t )φ¯3p¯
α
α−β
t .
Since
Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt,
(6.27) becomes
(
NLt +N
H
t
)
φ¯4p¯
α
α−β
t = (N
L
t+1 +N
H
t+1)φ1p¯
1
α−β
t+1 (6.28)
+ (NLt +N
H
t )φ¯2p¯
α
α−β
t p¯
1−α
α−β
t+1
+ (NLt +N
H
t )φ¯3p¯
α
α−β
t .
Rearranging terms of (6.28) we can easily get an expression for determining the
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steady state price ratio:
(
NLt +N
H
t
)
(φ¯4 − φ¯3) = (N
L
t+1 +N
H
t+1)φ1

 p¯
1
α−β
t+1
p¯
α
α−β
t



 p¯−
α
α−β
t+1
p¯
−
α
α−β
t+1


+ (NLt +N
H
t )φ¯2p¯
1−α
α−β
t+1
=

(NLt+1 +NHt+1)φ1
(
p¯t+1
p¯t
) α
α−β
+ (NLt +N
H
t )φ¯2

 p¯ 1−αα−βt+1
Thus,
p¯
1−α
α−β
t+1 =
(NLt +N
H
t )(φ¯4 − φ¯3)
(NLt+1 +N
H
t+1)φ1
(
p¯t+1
p¯t
) α
α−β + (NLt +N
H
t )φ¯2
(6.29)
Therefore,
p¯t+1 =

(N
L
t+1 +N
H
t+1)φ1
(
p¯t+1
p¯t
) α
α−β + (NLt +N
H
t )φ¯2
(NLt +N
H
t )(φ¯4 − φ¯3)


β−α
1−α
(6.30)
Solving for the steady state equilibrium under trade requires that p¯t = p¯t+1 = p¯s.
So, (6.30) implies that there is a p¯s > 0 such that we get
p¯s =
(
(NLs+1 +N
H
s+1)φ1 + (N
L
s +N
H
s )φ¯2
(NLs +N
H
s )(φ¯4 − φ¯3)
)β−α
1−α
=
(
φ¯2
φ¯4 − φ¯3
+
φ1
φ¯4 − φ¯3
(
NLs+1 +N
H
s+1
NLs +N
H
s
))β−α
1−α
. (6.31)
Let
Φ¯ =
φ¯2
φ¯4 − φ¯3
+
φ1
φ¯4 − φ¯3
(
NLs+1 +N
H
s+1
NLs +N
H
s
)
. (6.32)
Then,
p¯s = Φ¯
β−α
1−α . (6.33)
Proposition 2 The common price ratio, p¯s, for this perfect foresight world econ-
omy model exists and is unique for all −1 < nL < nH and given values of α, β,
µ, θ that lie strictly between 0 and 1 such that α 6= β, and satisfies the interior
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solution condition.4
Proof:
Uniqueness follows from the long-run closed form solution for ps in (6.31), and
the existence is assured by showing that φ¯4 − φ¯3 > 0. An interior solution would
require that x¯i1s > 0 and x¯
i
2s > 0 for i = L,H . Now,
φ¯4 − φ¯3 = (1− µ)(1− β)l¯δ
β − (1− µ)(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ)l¯βδβ−1
= (1− µ)(1− β)l¯δβ
(
1− (1− θ)β(1−
ǫ
δ
)
)
(6.34)
The sign of φ¯4 − φ¯3 depends on the sign of 1− (1− θ)β(1−
ǫ
δ
). So,
1− (1− θ)β(1−
ǫ
δ
) = 1−
(1− θ)(β − α)
(1− α)
. (6.35)
In fact, φ¯4 − φ¯3 > 0 if and only if 1−
(1−θ)(β−α)
(1−α)
> 0.
Now,
1−
(1− θ)(β − α)
(1− α)
> 0
(1− θ)(β − α)
(1− α)
< 1
(1− α) + α(1− θ) > (1− θ)β
1− αθ
1− θ
> β
since 1−αθ
1−θ
> 1, and 0 < β < 1. Then, 1−αθ
1−θ
> β holds for any given α, β and θ.
Thus φ¯4 − φ¯3 > 0 for any given 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1, 0 < µ < 1, 0 < θ < 1 and
0 < l¯.
However, for an interior solution, x¯ijs needs to be positive for any i = L,H and
4The convergence of the steady state price ratio ps as s→∞ is carried out in section 6.3
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j = 1, 2.
We have
x¯i1s = l¯
i
1sǫ
αp¯
α
α−β
s (6.36)
x¯i2s = l¯
i
2sδ
β p¯
α
α−β
s (6.37)
Using
l¯i1s =
δ
δ − ǫ
−
1
δ − ǫ
k¯isp¯
1
β−α
s , (6.38)
l¯i2s = −
ǫ
δ − ǫ
+
1
δ − ǫ
k¯isp¯
1
β−α
s , (6.39)
δ
δ − ǫ
=
β(1− α)
(β − α)
, (6.40)
ǫ
δ − ǫ
=
α(1− β)
(β − α)
, (6.41)
(1− β)δβ = (1− α)ǫα, (6.42)
βδβ−1 = αǫα−1, (6.43)
k¯is =
1
1 + ni
φ¯4Φ¯
−
α
1−α , (6.44)
p¯s = Φ¯
β−α
1−α , (6.45)
we get
x¯i1s =
β(1− α)
(β − α)
ǫαΦ¯−
α
1−α
(
1−
α
β
(1− β)(1− µ)
1 + ni
ǫα−1Φ¯
)
(6.46)
x¯i2s =
α(1− α)
(β − α)
ǫαΦ¯−
β
1−α
(
−1 +
(1− α)(1− µ)
1 + ni
ǫα−1Φ¯
)
(6.47)
Therefore, x¯i1s > 0 if and only if


Φ¯ > β
α
(1+ni)
(1−β)(1−µ)
ǫ1−α for α > β,
Φ¯ < β
α
(1+ni)
(1−β)(1−µ)
ǫ1−α for α < β.
(6.48)
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and x¯i2s > 0 if and only if


Φ¯ < (1+n
i)
(1−α)(1−µ)
ǫ1−α for α > β,
Φ¯ > (1+n
i)
(1−α)(1−µ)
ǫ1−α for α < β.
(6.49)
6.2 Long-run Closed Form Solutions under
Trade
Once p¯s is determined, the steady state magnitudes of the rest of the macroeco-
nomic variables will be straightforward to obtain. Since,
k¯is =
1
1 + ni
φ¯4p¯
α
α−β
s for i = H,L. (6.50)
the steady state expression of the per capita capital under trade is obtained as
k¯is =
1
1 + ni
φ¯4Φ¯
−
α
1−α for i = L,H. (6.51)
by substituting (6.31) in (6.50).
As the wage rate is given by
w¯s = (1− β)δ
βp¯
α
α−β
s
= (1− α)ǫαp¯
α
α−β
s , (6.52)
the steady state expression for the wage rate under trade is found to be
w¯s = (1− β)δ
βΦ¯−
α
1−α
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= (1− α)ǫαΦ¯−
α
1−α (6.53)
by substituting (6.31) in (6.52).
Likewise, given the expression for steady state rental rate:
r¯s = βδ
β−1p¯
α−1
α−β
s
= αǫα−1p¯
α−1
α−β
s , (6.54)
the steady state rental rate under trade is obtained by substituting (6.31) in
(6.54) as
r¯s = βδ
β−1Φ¯
= αǫα−1Φ¯. (6.55)
Finally, the long-run real per capita consumptions under trade are given by
c¯1ys = µθ(1− α)ǫ
αΦ¯−
α
1−α , (6.56)
c¯2ys = µ(1− θ)(1− α)ǫ
αΦ¯−
β
1−α , (6.57)
c¯1os = (1− µ)θ(1− α)ǫ
α(1 + αǫα−1Φ¯)Φ¯−
α
1−α , (6.58)
c¯2os = (1− µ)(1− θ)(1− α)ǫ
α(1 + αǫα−1Φ¯)Φ¯−
β
1−α . (6.59)
6.3 The Role of Population Growth Rate
under Trade
In order to proceed with our analysis, let’s assume without loss of generality
that sector 1 is relatively capital intensive and thus sector 2 is relatively labor
intensive. Hence α > β. In line with the static Heckscher-Ohlin framework,
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our model suggests that the high population growth rate-country (H) must be
expected to have a comparative advantage in the production of good 2 and the a
low population growth rate-country (L) must be expected to have a comparative
advantage in the production of good 1.
In the long-run, s → ∞. Recalling that we consider differences in the popu-
lation growth rates only, the initial population sizes of both countries are equal
(that is NH1 = N
L
1 ). Hence, rewriting (6.31) we obtain
p¯s =
((
(1 + nL)s+1 + (1 + nH)s+1
(1 + nL)s + (1 + nH)s
)
φ1
φ¯4 − φ¯3
+
φ¯2
φ¯4 − φ¯3
)β−α
1−α
, (6.60)
and
Φ¯ =
(
(1 + nL)s+1 + (1 + nH)s+1
(1 + nL)s + (1 + nH)s
)
φ1
φ¯4 − φ¯3
+
φ¯2
φ¯4 − φ¯3
. (6.61)
Hence, the expression of the steady state price ratio will simply be
p¯s = Φ¯
β−α
1−α . (6.62)
Now, p¯s will clearly converge as Φ¯ will converge to
lim
s→∞
Φ¯ = (1 + nH)
φ1
φ¯4 − φ¯3
+
φ¯2
φ¯4 − φ¯3
. (6.63)
To see this, one can express the first term of Φ¯ in (6.61) as
1 +
nL
(
1+nL
1+nH
)s
+ nH(
1+nL
1+nH
)s
+ 1
. (6.64)
Since
1 + nL
1 + nH
< 1,
this ratio will approach to 0 as s→∞. Then the whole expression in (6.64) will
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converge to (1 + nH) yielding (6.63). Hence,
lim
s→∞
p¯s =
(
(1 + nH)
φ1
φ¯4 − φ¯3
+
φ¯2
φ¯4 − φ¯3
)β−α
1−α
, (6.65)
implying that the common steady state price ratio, p¯s, will be driven by n
H , the
growth rate of faster growing population in H .
In fact, it could be observed that had there been no difference between popu-
lation growth rates or had nL been as high as nH , steady state price ratio in (6.60)
would have been the same as autarky relative price ratio in (3.74). Thus, as long
as nH > nL, trade will cause common relative price ratio to be established at the
autarky relative price of faster population growth country H in the long-run.
Corollary 4 Free trade decreases the relative price of labor-intensive commodity
2 in the slow-population growth (capital-abundant) country L, towards that of the
fast-population growth (labor-abundant) country H.
First of all, by looking at the expressions of φ’s given in (3.63),(3.64) and (3.67)
and those given in (6.21),(6.22) and (6.25), it is easily seen that
φ2 =
1
1 + n
φ¯2, (6.66)
φ3 =
1
1 + n
φ¯3, (6.67)
φ4 =
1
1 + n
φ¯4. (6.68)
Now, the above corollary can be easily seen by using (6.66), (6.67), (6.68) to
rewrite the expression for the steady state relative price under autarky from
(3.74) as
pis =
(
φ¯4 − φ¯3
(1 + ni)φ1 + φ¯2
)α−β
1−α
for i = L,H, (6.69)
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Rewriting the common relative price ratio expression under trade from (6.65) in
a similar form yields
p¯s =
(
φ¯4 − φ¯3
(1 + nH)φ1 + φ¯2
)α−β
1−α
. (6.70)
Since nH > nL and α > β, pLs > p¯s = p
H
s . Given that (1+n
H) in the denominator
of the ratio in (6.70) is nothing but
lim
s→∞
1 +
nL
(
1+nL
1+nH
)s
+ nH(
1+nL
1+nH
)s
+ 1
, (6.71)
convergence of relative price ratio under trade to p¯s = p
H
s will be quicker, the
higher the difference between nL and nH is (or the closer the ratio 1+n
L
1+nH
is to 0).
In other words, the higher the difference between the population growth rates is,
the larger the decrease in the relative price of commodity 2 for the low population
growth rate-country will be. This is a significant finding, since it implies that for
a high enough difference between nH and nL, country H will quickly start acting
as a large country that is capable of setting the terms of trade close to its autarky
relative price ratio.
Proof:
Let’s rewrite the expressions of the price ratios under autarky, given in (6.69),
into the following
pis = (φ¯4 − φ¯3)
α−β
1−α
(
φ¯2 + φ1(1 + n
i)
) β−α
1−α for i = L,H, (6.72)
and the steady state expression of the price ratio under trade, given in (6.60), as
p¯s = (φ¯4 − φ¯3)
α−β
1−α
(
φ¯2 + φ1
(1 + nL)s+1 + (1 + nH)s+1
(1 + nL)s + (1 + nH)s
)β−α
1−α
. (6.73)
Now, in order to compare pis and p¯s, it is sufficient to just compare the second
terms within the second pair of parentheses. Considering first the case of i = L
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in (6.72) and (6.73),
(1 + nL)−
(1 + nH)s+1 + (1 + nL)s+1
(1 + nH)s + (1 + nL)s
=
(1 + nH)s(nL − nH)
(1 + nH)s + (1 + nL)s
.
Since nL < nH , the RHS of this equation is negative. Then,
(1 + nL) <
(1 + nH)s+1 + (1 + nL)s+1
(1 + nH)s + (1 + nL)s
Thus,
pLs < p¯s.
Now,
lim
s→∞
(1 + nH)s(nL − nH)
(1 + nH)s + (1 + nL)s
= lim
s→∞
1(nL − nH)
1 +
(
1+nL
1+nH
)s
= (nL − nH).
So, it is clear from the above that the higher the difference between nH and nL,
the smaller the ratio
(
1+nL
1+nH
)
is and the quicker the ratio (n
L
−nH)
1+
(
1+nL
1+nH
)s converges to
(nL−nH). Hence, the higher the difference between the population growth rates,
the quicker the price ratio of the low population growth rate-country converges
to that of the high population growth rate-country.
Turning to the case of i = H in (6.72) now,
(1 + nH)−
(1 + nH)s+1 + (1 + nL)s+1
(1 + nH)s + (1 + nL)s
=
(1 + nL)s(nH − nL)
(1 + nH)s + (1 + nL)s
.
Again, nH > nL implying that the RHS of this equation is positive. Thus,
(1 + nH)s+1 + (1 + nL)s+1
(1 + nH)s + (1 + nL)s
< (1 + nH).
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implying that
pLs < p¯s < p
H
s .
Similarly,
lim
s→∞
(1 + nL)s(nH − nL)
(1 + nH)s + (1 + nL)s
= lim
s→∞
(
1+nL
1+nH
)s
(nH − nL)
1 +
(
1+nL
1+nH
)s
= 0.
Hence, the higher the difference between the population growth rates, the quicker
the price ratio under trade for the high population growth rate-country settles
on its autarky level.
Corollary 5 In the long-run, free trade
• reduces the steady state magnitude of per capita capital stock in the low
population growth rate-country, without affecting it in the high population
growth rate-country, and
• leads to a decrease in the steady state wage rate, and an increase in the
steady state rental rate of the low population growth rate-country towards
the steady state factor prices in the high population growth rate-country.
Using (3.81) and (6.66) through (6.67), the steady state expression for per capita
capital under autarky can be rewritten as
kis =
φ¯4
1 + ni
(
φ¯4 − φ¯3
(1 + ni)φ1 + φ¯2
) α
1−α
for i = L,H, (6.74)
In a similar form, the steady state expression for per capita capital under trade
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from (6.51) can be rewritten using (6.63) as
k¯is =
φ¯4
1 + ni
(
φ¯4 − φ¯3
(1 + nH)φ1 + φ¯2
) α
1−α
for i = L,H, (6.75)
under trade. Since nH > nL, kHs < k
L
s by (6.74), and k¯
L
s < k
L
s . In other words,
trade will pull down per capita level of capital stock in L. Equations (6.74) and
(6.75) further imply that the higher the difference between population growth
rates is, the larger the effect on per capita capital stock of the low-population
growth country L will be.
The steady state wage rate expression under autarky from (3.83) can be rewrit-
ten by using (6.66) through (6.67) as
wis = (1− α)ǫ
α
(
φ¯4 − φ¯3
(1 + ni)φ1 + φ¯2
) α
1−α
for i = L,H (6.76)
since nH > nL, wHs < w
L
s as established by (6.76). The common wage rate under
trade from (6.53), on the other hand, is rewritten by using (6.63) and given by
w¯s = (1− α)ǫ
α
(
φ¯4 − φ¯3
(1 + nH)φ1 + φ¯2
) α
1−α
(6.77)
clearly indicating that wHs = w¯s < w
L
s . In addition, equation (6.77) implies that
the reduction in the autarky wage rate experienced by the slow-population growth
country L will be relatively higher for a larger difference between nH and nL.
As for the rental rate, its steady state expression under autarky given in (3.85)
can be shown to be equivalent to
ris = αǫ
α−1
(
(1 + ni)φ1 + φ¯2
φ¯4 − φ¯3
)
for i = L,H, (6.78)
by using (6.66) through (6.67). The steady state rental rate expression under
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trade given in (6.55) is now rewritten by using (6.63) as
r¯s = αǫ
α−1
(
(1 + nH)φ1 + φ¯2
φ¯4 − φ¯3
)
. (6.79)
Since nH > nL, rHs > r
L
s . Once again, the common rental rate after trade would
settle at rHs = r¯s > r
L
s . It is now straightforward to see that the higher the
difference in the population growth rates between the trading partners is, the
higher the effect of trade on the rental rate of the low population growth rate-
country will be.
Thus, our model suggests, in line with the expectations based on the solution
of the autarky model as discussed in the previous section, that the high population
growth rate-country (H) will have a comparative advantage in the production of
labor-intensive consumption good 2, and the low population growth rate-country
(L) will have a comparative advantage in the production of capital-intensive good
1 that serves as both an investment good and a consumption good. Furthermore,
relative commodity and factor prices under trade will initially lie between cor-
responding autarky prices just as in the static Heckscher-Ohlin framework, con-
verging to the pre-trade prices for country H in the long-run. This implies that
trade creates a tendency for the high population growth rate-country H to pull
the magnitudes of all variables towards its own steady state autarky magnitudes
in the long-run. In fact, the larger the difference between population growth rates
is, the stronger this tendency will get, more quickly enabling country H to behave
as the large country that sets the terms of trade.
The challenges that remain now are i) to show that trade may continue to
occur in the long-run despite the equalization of these prices under trade, as long
as population growth rates are different, and ii) to compare welfare levels across
autarky and trade scenarios.
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Corollary 6 The nations considered may continue trading in the long-run as a
result of the differences in population growth rates alone, as the initial pattern of
comparative advantages are preserved at the steady state.
To prove Corollary 6, it suffices to show that domestic markets will not clear.
Instead, each country will have an excess supply of one commodity (to be ex-
ported), and an excess demand for the other (to be satisfied through imports).
Below, we show only the long-run expression for the excess supply of good 2 by
country H .
Proof:
The steady state output of good 2 by country H is given by
x¯H2s = l¯
H
2sδ
β p¯
β
α−β
s . (6.80)
Now, using the following
δ
δ − ǫ
=
β(1− α)
β − α
,
ǫ
δ − ǫ
=
α(1− β)
β − α
αǫα−1 = βδβ−1,
(1− α)ǫα = (1− β)δβ,
and substituting (6.33), (6.15) and (6.16) evaluated at the steady state for country
H , in (6.80) we get
xH2s = −
(
ǫ
δ − ǫ
)
δβΦ¯−
β
1−α +
(
δ
δ − ǫ
)
(1− µ)(1− β)
(1 + nH)
δ2β−1Φ¯
1−α−β
1−α
= −
(
α(1− β)
β − α
)
δβΦ¯−
β
1−α +
(
β(1− α)
β − α
)
(1− µ)(1− β)
(1 + nH)
δ2β−1Φ¯
1−α−β
1−α
= −
α(1− α)
β − α
ǫαΦ¯−
β
1−α +
α(1− α)
β − α
(1− µ)(1− β)
(1 + nH)
ǫ2β−1Φ¯
1−α−β
1−α
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=
α
β − α
(1− α)ǫαΦ¯−
β
1−α
(
−1 +
(1− µ)(1− α)
1 + nH
ǫα−1Φ¯
)
. (6.81)
The long-run total real consumption, on the other hand, is given by
NHs c¯
H
2ys +N
H
s−1c¯
H
2os = N
H
s µ(1− θ)(1− α)ǫ
αΦ¯−
β
1−α
+ NHs−1(1− µ)(1− θ)(1− α)ǫ
α(1 + αǫα−1Φ¯)Φ¯−
β
1−α
= (1− θ)(1− α)ǫαΦ¯−
β
1−αNHs
(
µ+
1− µ
1 + nH
+
1− µ
1 + nH
αǫα−1Φ¯
)
.
Now, excess supply of good 2 by country H (ExsH2 ) is total production of good
2 less total domestic consumption of that good. Thus
ExsH2 = N
H
s x¯
H
2s − (N
H
s c¯
H
2ys +N
H
s−1c¯
H
2os).
Hence,
ExsH2 = (1− α)ǫ
αΦ¯−
β
1−αNHs
{
−
α
β − α
− (1− θ)
(
µ+
1− µ
1 + nH
)
+
1− µ
1 + nH
αǫα−1Φ¯
(
1− α
β − α
)}
Thus, ExsH2 > 0 if
−
α
β − α
− (1− θ)
(
µ+
1− µ
1 + nH
)
+
1− µ
1 + nH
αǫα−1Φ¯
(
1− α
β − α
)
> 0. (6.82)
Claim 1
Φ¯ =
1
αǫα−1[(1− α)− (1− θ)(β − α)]
{
N¯
µ(1− θ)(β − α) + α
(1− µ)
+ (1− θ)(β − α)
}
,
where
N¯ =
NLs+1 +N
H
s+1
NLs +N
H
s
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=
(1 + nL)NLs + (1 + n
H)NHs
NLs +N
H
s
.
Proof:
Substituting (6.21), (6.22), (6.23) and (6.25) in the expression of Φ¯ given in (6.32)
we get
Φ¯ = N¯
µ(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ) + ǫ
(1− µ)(1− β)δβ(1− (1− θ)β(1− ǫ
δ
)
+
(1− θ)(δ − ǫ)
δβ(1− (1− θ)β(1− ǫ
δ
)
= N¯
µ(1− θ)(1− β)(δ − ǫ) + ǫ
δ
(1− µ)(1− β)δβ−1(1− (1− θ)β(1− ǫ
δ
)
+
(1− θ)(1− ǫ
δ
)
δβ−1(1− (1− θ)β(1− ǫ
δ
)
Substituting this expression for Φ¯ into the inequality in (6.82) and rearranging
terms result in ExsH2 > 0 if
1− µ
(1 + nH)(β − α)
(
N¯
µ(1− θ)(β − α) + α
(1− µ)
+ (1− θ)(β − α)
)
>
α
β − α
+ (1− θ)µ+
(1− µ)(1− θ)
1 + nH
.
Thus, ExsH2 > 0 if
(
N¯
1 + nH
− 1
)(
µ(1− θ) +
α
β − α
)
> 0.
Since
N¯
1 + nH
− 1 < 0,
ExsH2 > 0 requires that
µ(1− θ) +
α
β − α
< 0
holds. But
µ(1− θ) <
α
α− β
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is always true for α > β, since µ(1− θ) < 1 and α
α−β
> 1.
Therefore,
ExsH2


> 0 for α > β
< 0 for α < β.
(6.83)
This implies that the country with a fast growing population (i.e., the labor-
abundant-country) will export the labor-intensive commodity 2, as expected.
Having shown that trade may continue to occur at the steady state, we can
now compare welfare levels across autarky and trade. Again, as expected from
solutions under autarky, it is not obvious that welfare results are consistent with
the static HO model.
Corollary 7 Free trade leads in the long-run to
• a decrease in per capita consumption by youngs of both goods in the low
population growth rate-country L,
• an ambiguous effect on the per capita consumption by olds of both goods in
the low population growth rate-country L, but
• no change in per capita consumption by youngs and olds of both goods in
the high population growth rate-country H.
The long-run equilibrium real per capita consumption of good 1 by the youngs
is given by (3.89) under autarky, and by (6.56) under trade. Since wHs = w¯s < w
L
s ,
cH1ys = c¯1ys < c
L
1ys
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and a similar ranking can be made for good 2. The long-run equilibrium real per
capita consumption by the youngs is given by (3.91) under autarky, and by (6.57)
under trade. Since,
wHs
pHs
=
w¯s
p¯s
<
wLs
pLs
,
cF2ys = c¯2ys < c
L
2ys.
Thus, trade leads to a decrease in the youngs’ consumption of both commodities
in country L in per capita terms.
Such a ranking, however, is not easy to find in the case of per capita con-
sumption of goods by the olds. For commodity 1, per capita consumption by
the olds under autarky is given by (3.93) Remembering that trade leads to a
decrease in the long-run wage rate but an increase in the long-run rental rate
for the slow-population growth country, the overall effect of trade on cL1os de-
pends on which effect dominates: the trade-induced increase in the rental rate
or the trade-induced decrease in the wage rate for the slow population growth
rate-country.
Similarly, since per capita consumption of good 2 by the olds under autarky is
given by (3.95), the overall effect of trade on cL2os would also depend on the relative
magnitudes of the trade-induced increase in the rental rate or the trade-induced
decrease in the wage rate.
To better visualize this, we summarize the pre-trade and post-trade relation-
ships between these two economies’ prices and evaluate the rental rate elasticity
of welfare.
It has been established before that
pLs < p
H
s ,
wLs < w
H
s , (6.84)
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rLs > r
H
s
under autarky. Now, when two countries begin trading with each other to make
use of these differences in autarky relative prices, they will export the commod-
ity in which they have a relative comparative advantage. This will lead to the
establishment of common relative commodity and factor prices lying between re-
spective autarky prices as predicted by the HO model. Thus, the opening of trade
will lead to an increase (no change) in pLs and w
L
s (p
H
s and w
H
s ) and a decrease
(no change) in rLs (r
H
s ). In other words,
pLs < p¯s = p
H
s ,
wLs < w¯s = w
H
s (6.85)
rLs > r¯s = r
H
s
It is obvious that the long-run welfare of the high population growth rate-country
is unaffected by trade. The question now is whether the trade-induced changes in
these autarky prices will unambiguously improve the welfare for the other trading
party, the slow population growth rate-country, as suggested by the static HO
model. The following corollary answers this question.
Corollary 8 The direction in which the life time utility of an individual in coun-
try L will change with the opening of trade depends on the sign of the elasticity
of
uLs = (c
L
1ys
θcL2ys
1−θ)µ(cL1os
θcL2os
1−θ)1−µ (6.86)
with respect to the trade-induced changes in relative commodity or factor prices.
Proof:
Let’s consider the reaction of steady state autarky of life time utility of an in-
dividual in country L to a trade-induced change in the rental for capital. We
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consider the trade-induced change in rLs only on account of the relative simplicity
of expressions. The same result will hold for pLs and w
L
s as well but showing
this will require more tedious algebraic derivations. Given uLs above, the relevant
elasticity can be expressed as
euLs ,rLs = µθecL1ys,rLs
+µ(1− θ)ecL
2ys
,rLs
+(1− µ)θecL
1os,r
L
s
+(1− µ)(1− θ)ecL
2os
,rLs
, (6.87)
where each e term with a subscript shows the elasticity of the steady state mag-
nitude of the variable denoted by the first term in the subscript with respect to
the steady state rental for capital, rLs .
Now, using (3.85) and (3.89), (3.91), (3.93) and (3.95) to obtain the steady
state magnitudes of per capita consumptions in terms of rLs , we get
c1ys = µθ(1− α)α
α
1−α r
α
α−1
s (6.88)
c2ys = µ(1− θ)(1− α)ǫ
α−βα
β
1−α r
β
α−1
s (6.89)
c1os = (1− µ)θ(1− α)α
α
1−α
(
r
α
α−1
s + r
α
α−1
+1
s
)
(6.90)
c2os = (1− µ)(1− θ)(1− α)ǫ
α−βα
β
1−α
(
r
β
α−1
s + r
β
α−1
+1
s
)
(6.91)
and evaluating their elasticities with respect to rLs we get
ecL
1ys,r
L
s
=
α
α− 1
, (6.92)
ecL
2ys
,rLs
=
β
α− 1
, (6.93)
ecL
1os
,rLs
=
α
α− 1
+
rLs
1 + rLs
, (6.94)
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ecL
2os
,rLs
=
β
α− 1
+
rLs
1 + rLs
. (6.95)
Substituting (6.92) through (6.95) in (6.87) we get
euLs ,rLs = θ
(
α
α− 1
)
+ (1− θ)
(
β
α− 1
)
+ (1− µ)
(
rLs
1 + rLs
)
. (6.96)
But
euLs ,rLs


< 0 if 1
rLs
> (1−µ)(1−α)
θα+(1−θ)β
− 1
> 0 otherwise.
(6.97)
The autarky steady state rental rate rLs will decrease in L after opening of
trade as shown in inequality (6.85). Since the elasticity in (6.96) is ambiguous in
sign, however, the direction of trade-induced change in uLs will not be as straight-
forward to tell as in the static HO model. This result is consistent with previously
cited OLG-GE studies based on stationary populations, as well as the recent work
by Sayan (2005) who considers a dynamic OLG-GE extension of the HO model
with population growth differentials.
It is conceivable that eus,rs < 0 may hold, unless there are additional restric-
tions on the values of parameters. Therefore, a country with a low population
growth rate may very well face a reduction in its autarky level of welfare after
beginning to trade with a high population growth rate-country.
6.4 A Numerical Example
In this section several simulation exercises are performed to visualize the time
paths of the model variables, as they are analytically challenging to obtain. The
model parameters chosen are given in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: Trade Model Parameter Values
α β µ θ l¯
0.50 0.30 0.80 0.40 1
The two trading countries are similar in every respect except for the popu-
lation growth rate. Hence, for the low population growth rate-country n = 0.16
(the equivalent of a 0.05% annual population growth rate, the unweighted average
of the population growth rate for the high income countries between 1980-2002
and the projected values from 2002-2015, WDI (2004)), and for the high popu-
lation growth rate-country, n = 0.7 (the equivalent of a 1.8% annual population
growth rate, the unweighted average of the population growth rate for the low in-
come countries between 1980-2002 and the projected values from 2002-2015, WDI
(2004)).
The time paths of per capita capital and the price ratio for the autarky and
the trade scenarios are given in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1 shows that the path of per capita capital for the low population
growth rate-country under autarky lies above that under trade. This follows from
(6.50) establishing that per capita capital and the price ratio are positively related
when α > β. The reduction in the price of good 2 in terms of good 1 for country
L as a consequence of trade leads to capital dilution. For the same reason the
path of per capita capital for the fast population growth rate-country under trade
is above that under autarky. Moreover, the low population growth rate-country’s
paths of per capita capital lie higher than those of the high population growth
rate-country under both scenarios. Thus, in the long-run free trade substantially
lowers the magnitude of per capita capital for the low population growth rate-
country, while converging to that of the high population growth rate-country.
Consistently with the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, opening of trade between
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Figure 6.1: Time Paths for Per Capita Capital and the Price Ratio
country L and H results in a common price ratio lying between autarky price
ratios. The price ratio path of both countries under free trade is lower than
that of the low population growth rate-country under the autarky scenario and
higher than that for the high population growth rate-country under the autarky
scenario. However, the price ratio path under free trade is closer to that of
the high population growth rate-country under autarky than to that of the low
population growth rate-country under autarky. The case of China today provides
a good example illustrating this point as China is now argued to have become a
price setter for labor-intensive manufactured goods in world markets and created
a competitive pressure that could trigger a global deflation as noted, for example,
by Yang (2003).
The magnitude of the steady state per capita capital and the price ratio under
both scenarios are given in Table 6.2. It is clear that, in the long-run free trade
results in a substantial decrease in the magnitude of per capita capital of country
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L with no change on that of country H , and a considerable decrease in the price
ratio of country L with a slight increase in the price ratio of country H .
Table 6.2: Equilibrium Magnitude of k and p under Autarky and Trade
Autarky Trade
Country L Country H Country L Country H
ks 0.0120 0.0055 0.081 0.0055
ps 0.4187 0.3567 0.3573 0.3573
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Figure 6.2: Time Paths for the Rental and the Wage Rates
Similar observations can be made for the rental rate and the wage rate. Trade
again results in a common rental rate and a common wage rate lying between
autarky rates. The time paths of the rental rate and the wage rate are given
in Figure 6.2. The common time path of the rental rate under free trade lies
between those of the two countries under autarky. However, it lies closer to
that of the high population growth rate-country than that of the low population
growth rate-country. Hence, in the long-run free trade results in a substantial
114
increase in the rental rate of the low population growth rate-country and a slight
decrease in that of the high population growth rate-country. This is also shown
by the values of the long-run rental rates of both countries under both scenarios
given in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Equilibrium Factor Prices under Autarky and Trade
Autarky Trade
Country L Country H Country L Country H
rs 3.5880 5.3550 5.3346 5.3346
ws 0.0697 0.0467 0.0469 0.0469
Similarly, the common time path of the wage rate under free trade lies between
those of the two countries under autarky, closer to that of the high population
growth rate-country. So, as it is reported in Table 6.3, in the long-run free trade
results in a substantial decrease in the rental rate of the low population growth
rate-country and a slight increase in that of the high population growth rate-
country.
The pattern of trade between these two countries that differ only in the pop-
ulation growth rates is plotted and given in Figure 6.3.
In line with the predictions of the autarky model, the low population growth
rate-country L exports commodity 1, the capital-intensive good and imports
commodity 2, the labor-intensive good. Whereas the high population growth
rate-country H exports commodity 2, the capital-intensive good and imports
commodity 1, the labor-intensive good.
Moreover, the long-run non-zero equilibrium values reveal that trade continues
in the long-run despite the equalization of prices. This is also observed from
the long-run values of the excess supply of each good by each country given in
Table 6.4.
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Figure 6.3: Excess Demand for and Supply of Goods
Real per capita consumptions by young of each good in each country under
both scenarios are given in Figure 6.4. Free trade results in a considerable decrease
in real per capita consumption of good 1 by young in the low population growth
rate-country, but just a temporary increase in that of the high population growth
rate-country. In a similar way free trade affects real per capita consumption of
good 2 by young.
Similarly to the effect of trade on real per capita consumptions of good 1 and
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Table 6.4: Excess Demand for Goods by Country
Country L Country H
exs1 0.4721 −0.4721
exs2 −1.3214 1.3214
where exsj is excess supply of good j.
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Figure 6.4: Time Paths for the First Period Consumptions
good 2 by young, real per capita consumption of good 1 by old of the low popu-
lation growth rate-country is decreased and that of the high population growth
rate-country is temporarily increased. This is given in Figure 6.5. However, the
effect of trade on the long-run real per capita consumption of good 2 by old is
different. In the long-run free trade results in a permanent increase in real per
capita consumption of good 2 by old in the low population growth rate-country
and almost no change in that of the high population growth rate-country.
Hence, in the long-run free trade leads to almost no change in the real per
capita consumptions in the high population growth rate-country and a decrease
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Figure 6.5: Time Paths for the Second Period Consumptions
in the real per capita consumptions in the low population growth rate-country
except for the consumption of good 2 by old.
Table 6.5: Per Capita Consumption Equilibrium under Autarky and Trade
Autarky Trade
Country L Country H Country L Country H
c1ys 0.0223 0.0149 0.0150 0.0150
c2ys 0.0799 0.0628 0.0630 0.0630
c1os 0.0256 0.0237 0.0238 0.0238
c2os 0.0916 0.0996 0.0998 0.0998
us 0.0493 0.0387 0.0389 0.0389
From Table 6.5, it is clearly observed that the pre-trade long-run per capita
consumption in the low population growth rate-country, country L, is higher
than that in the high population growth rate-country, country H , except for
the consumption of good 2 by old. Free trade in the long-run makes the high
population growth rate-country act as a large country and brings real per capita
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consumptions in the low population growth rate-country to its autarky real per
capita consumption values.
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Figure 6.6: Time Paths for the Individual’s Utility
Figure 6.6 shows the time paths of utility under trade and autarky scenarios
for both countries. Free trade leads to a significant decrease in the utility of
the low population growth rate-country and a temporarily increase in that of the
high population growth rate-country. Hence, this case clearly shows that not both
partners involved into trade gain from trade. In fact the low population growth
rate-country would be made worse off by trade, whereas the high population
growth rate-country obtains temporary gains that disappear in the long-run.
In this chapter we have analyzed the effect of population growth rate differ-
ences on trade between two equal-sized countries. It would also be interesting to
look at the case of a small country with a high population growth rate trading
with a low population growth country that is initially capable of setting the terms
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of trade. This scenario involving a low population growth rate-country as an in-
ternational price setter and the high population growth rate-country as a small
country at the time of the opening of trade certainly would be worth studying in
the future.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing study clearly demonstrates that the long-run closed form solu-
tions of a two-sector, two-generation, two-factor autarky economy are feasible to
obtain. As differently from the standard two sector literature, one of the goods is
allowed to be used for consumption as well as for investment and the other good
is allowed to be used for consumption only. Eventhough this adds to the com-
plexity of the individual’s problem, it captures a more realistic set up concerning
several consumption goods that can be used for investment purposes as well.
The analysis in chapter 5 has shown that when the model is solved under
autarky, differences in the population growth rates alone are observed to give rise
to comparative advantages by leading to different relative prices across countries,
regardless of initial population sizes of trading countries. In other words, the only
difference in demographic characteristics that matters for the direction of product
and factor flows is the one between population growth rates. An examination of
the sensitivity of the steady state relative price ratio under autarky to changes in
population growth rate will indeed identify directions of comparative advantages
correctly.
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The discussion of the long-run closed form solutions to the 2x2 and 2x2x2
OLG model has shown that of the two countries/regions that are identical in ev-
ery respect except the population growth rates, the high(low) population growth
rate-country will become labor-(capital-) abundant over time, and must be ex-
pected to have a comparative advantage in the production of labor-(capital-)
intensive commodity, as suggested by the static HO model. Furthermore, we
have shown that as long as the population growth rates remain different, there
will be room for trade to continue to occur in the long-run. Contrary to the
static HO model predictions which states that trade itself would, in the long-run,
eliminate the initial differences between relative factor endowments of countries
that are assumed to be identical in every other respect, thereby leaving no further
incentives for partners to continue trading.
While the population size does not directly affect the long-run equilibrium, the
discussion in chapter 6 about the changes that the opening of trade introduced
to relative commodity and factor prices prevailing under autarky hinted that
initial population sizes of trading nations may play a role in determining the
gains from trade over the time path to the steady state. That’s because trade
empowers the high population growth rate-country H to pull the quantities of
all variables towards its own steady state autarky quantities in the long-run. In
fact, we have shown that this convergence will be reduced sooner, the larger the
difference between population growth rates. This implies that country H will
behave as a large country capable of setting the terms of trade in the long-run, as
a result of the parallel growth in its share of total world output and population.
Symmetrically, the low population growth rate-country L will become a small
country, and will begin to act as a price taker in trade. Thus, unless there is
a large enough differential in initial population sizes, fast growing population of
country H will soon overtake country L in size, and the diverging population
sizes will lead to a divergence in the shares of countries in total world output.
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If the resulting difference between these shares becomes sufficiently large before
the steady state is reached, country H will practically begin to act as the price
setter, thereby driving all results. Such a dominance will cause welfare of the
world to converge to the autarky welfare of country H , creating welfare losses
for country L. It would therefore be correct to argue that initial population size
would matter in determining the nature of pre-steady state gains from trade, even
though direction of trade itself is determined by differences in population growth
rates alone.
Another main contribution is that the analysis in this dissertation has shown
that demographically induced differences in relative endowments by themselves
are not sufficient for trade to be beneficial to both parties in the long-run, and
offered a new explanation for this, adding to previously suggested reasons as to
why trade may not be Pareto-superior to autarky in a dynamic, OLG set-up.
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